Peace, justice and strong institutions – DDRN

Climate Change and the Risk of State Extinction: A Challenge for International Law

Sofia Kiryttopoulou — Fri, 24 Apr 2026 11:50:20 +0000

Climate change is usually discussed as an environmental or economic problem. For some countries, however, it represents a far more fundamental challenge: a threat to their continued existence as states. Rising sea levels, coastal erosion and environmental degradation are already affecting several low-lying island countries, particularly in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

For states such as the Maldives, Tuvalu and Kiribati, climate change is not a distant scenario but a present reality. If sea levels continue to rise during the twenty-first century, parts of their territory may become uninhabitable or even disappear entirely. This possibility raises a primary legal question: what happens to a state if it loses its territory?

The Crisis of Traditional Statehood

International law has traditionally assumed that states are stable territorial entities. Under traditional international law, a state is defined by the criteria established in the 1933 Montevideo Convention: a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states. Modern legal theory further emphasizes independence and the effective exercise of authority over a specific geographic area.

The climate crisis challenges this assumption. International law has historically dealt with the disappearance or transformation of states in political contexts such as war, annexation or state succession. The idea that a state might disappear due to environmental change is largely absent from existing legal frameworks. If a state were to lose its entire territory, it is unclear whether it could continue to exist as a subject of international law.

Small Island Developing States at Risk

The states most exposed to this risk belong largely to the group of Small Island Developing States (SIDS), a coalition of island and coastal countries that face structural vulnerabilities due to their small land area, geographic isolation and strong dependence on coastal ecosystems. According to the United Nations Office of the High Representative for Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States, these states are among the most vulnerable to climate change despite contributing minimally to global greenhouse gas emissions.

Many SIDS consist of coral atolls or low-lying islands where the highest elevation is only a few meters above sea level. As a result, even relatively modest sea-level rise can lead to coastal erosion, saltwater intrusion into freshwater supplies and the loss of habitable land. These pressures are already affecting communities in the Pacific and Indian Oceans and are expected to intensify throughout the century.

Because their territory is so limited, SIDS often have few options for internal relocation. This makes them particularly vulnerable not only to environmental degradation but also to the legal uncertainties that may arise if territorial loss accelerates.

Survival Strategies for Vulnerable States

In response to these risks, governments and scholars have begun exploring a range of potential strategies aimed at ensuring the survival of states threatened by climate change. These strategies generally fall into three broad categories: territorial adaptation, population relocation and legal innovation.

Territorial Adaptation

One approach focuses on preserving habitable territory through large-scale adaptation projects. These measures include coastal defenses, land reclamation and the construction of artificial islands designed to withstand rising sea levels.

Some island governments have already invested heavily in such initiatives. In the Maldives, for example, extensive land reclamation has been used to expand and elevate artificial islands such as Hulhumalé, a reclaimed island developed as a climate-resilient urban hub and built roughly two meters above sea level to reduce flooding risks. Experimental floating infrastructure projects have also been proposed as potential long-term solutions.

While these engineering solutions may help maintain habitable land and delay environmental pressures, they require significant financial resources and technical capacity. For many vulnerable states, implementing such large-scale projects remains a major challenge.

Planned Relocation and Mobility

A second strategy focuses on the relocation of populations as environmental conditions gradually deteriorate. Relocation may take place within national territory where possible, but in some cases it may involve migration to other states through bilateral agreements.

Some governments have already begun exploring long-term relocation options. Kiribati, for instance, has pursued policies aimed at preparing its population for international mobility through education and labor migration programs, often described as a strategy of “migration with dignity.” These initiatives aim to ensure that mobility occurs gradually and voluntarily rather than as a sudden humanitarian crisis.

Although relocation strategies can help protect affected populations, they raise complex questions about citizenship, political identity and the continued functioning of state institutions.

Even when relocation is carefully planned, it exposes a critical gap in International Law: individuals forced to leave their homes due to climate-induced territorial loss currently lack clear legal protections, because they do not meet the criteria set by the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. The Convention requires a “well-founded fear of being persecuted” on grounds such as race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, a standard that neither environmental disasters nor rising sea levels satisfy. This is why the term “climate refugee” has no formal status in international law.

As a result, individuals displaced by the physical disappearance of their home states are denied the same legal protections or rights to asylum as political refugees, leaving their fate subject to the discretionary policies of host nations. This legal invisibility reflects a broader “crisis of identity” in the field: while the physical reality of displacement is undeniable, formal legal structures remain rooted in a pre-climate era, failing to provide a collective security framework for populations whose sovereign bond to their land has been severed by nature rather than politics.

Legal Continuity Without Territory

A third strategy involves the development of legal frameworks that would allow states to maintain their international legal personality even if their territory becomes uninhabitable.

Recent diplomatic initiatives suggest that such ideas are beginning to enter international practice. In 2023, Tuvalu signed the Falepili Union Treaty with Australia, which includes provisions recognizing the continuing statehood and sovereignty of Tuvalu despite the long-term risks posed by sea-level rise.

In parallel, scholars have proposed additional legal approaches, such as preserving existing maritime boundaries even if coastlines retreat. These discussions are closely linked to the interpretation of maritime rights under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which governs the establishment of maritime zones.

Such proposals seek to ensure that vulnerable states retain control over their maritime resources and maintain their status within the international community even under changing environmental conditions.

Rethinking Statehood in the Age of Climate Change

None of these strategies alone provides a complete solution. Territorial adaptation may only delay environmental pressures, relocation raises difficult political and social questions, and legal innovations still require broader international recognition.

What the experience of vulnerable island states demonstrates is that climate change challenges some of the most basic assumptions on which the international legal system has historically been built. The traditional link between territory, population and sovereignty may no longer be as stable as previously assumed.

For this reason, the growing risk of climate-induced state extinction is not only a concern for a small group of island states. It represents a broader challenge for international law and the international community as a whole.

As sea levels continue to rise, the central question may not simply be whether certain territories will disappear, but whether international law can evolve quickly enough to ensure that the states and populations affected by these changes are not erased from the global order.

Sofia Kiryttopoulou is studying for a Bachelor’s Degree in Balkan, Slavic and Oriental Studies. Specialization: Politics and Law, at University of Macedonia | Thessaloniki, Greece.

Namokora: Revisiting a Forgotten Massacre in Northern Uganda

William Odinga Balikuddembe — Tue, 21 Apr 2026 15:51:26 +0000

In Uganda, it is now forty years since President Yoweri Museveni captured power, and he has ruled ever since. When his National Resistance Army (NRA) fought its way into power in January 1986, unease swept through Namokora — a remote community 500 kilometres north of Kampala and the birthplace of the ousted president, Tito Okello Lutwa. Seven months later, that unease turned to horror. A brutal massacre unfolded, claiming 68 lives. Bodies lay unburied for weeks as scavengers tore at the remains. Nearly four decades later, the cries for justice still echo unanswered.

Researchers at Gulu University are now revisiting the incident, documenting testimonies from survivors, witnesses and victims’ families as part of efforts to preserve the historical record and inform ongoing discussions about recognition, justice and reparations.

Testimonies

Seated outside the house where he lived as a young man in Guruguru village, Atanansio Oyet, now 61, recalls the experience vividly.

“On the morning of August 19, one soldier whispered that we were going to be killed. Soon after, the soldiers formed two lines from our detention room to a parked lorry, beating us with clubs, gun butts, and kicks as we ran and climbed aboard. You had to grab a hanging rope while those already inside pulled you up. As we left Namokora Centre, a woman at the back held her head in her hands. Suddenly, she jumped off and ran into the bush. Another man jumped too, but he fell badly and couldn’t move. Then a few others and I jumped. The soldiers in the escort car behind us opened fire, killing people — those running and those still in the lorry,” narrates Oyet.

Oyet was rounded up from his home on August 15 in what appeared to be a random operation. He was taken to a small church room in Namokora trading centre, where others from Namokora and neighbouring sub-counties were being detained. They were subjected to torture during interrogations about guns and soldiers from the toppled regime. When he eventually returned to his village, it was deserted. His family and neighbours were hiding on a hill known as Akara. They remained in hiding for three months, venturing cautiously back to their homes only to harvest food.

Uthant Okot was only 16 and a boarding student at Kitgum High School when the massacre occurred. His father, Yonah Yesalom Okot, was among those killed — despite being an NRA collaborator and the Resistance Council III (RCIII) chairman for Namokora Subcounty under the new regime.

Yonah had fled Uganda’s capital Kampala after the overthrow of Lutwa. Having lived in the city for many years, he spoke both Luganda and Swahili. This made him the first point of contact between the NRA — reportedly commanded by Captain Matovu, whose name suggests he is a Muganda — and the Acholi-speaking community of northern Uganda.

“The NRA soldiers arrived around April or May 1986,” recalls Okot. “Our people feared there would be retaliation. Many had fled — some to Southern Sudan — but the soldiers came with a friendly approach. They would even play football with the kids here.”

For months, the soldiers seemed friendly, and people returned from hiding. But in July, an ambush on NRA troops by remnants of Tito Okello’s Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) reportedly took place at a centre called Akilok in Namokora sub county. It shattered that fragile calm.

The massacre

“Once some NRA soldiers were killed in the ambush, everything changed. Between August 10 and 15, they began rounding up villagers from Namokora and nearby sub-counties. Whoever they saw was now considered a rebel. They went on a rampage — killing people, raping women, and destroying granaries. Those they arrested were packed into a small church room at Namokora Mission — men and women alike,” said Okot.

August 19 was a Tuesday, a market day in Namokora. People had come from surrounding sub-counties, including Orom, Omiya Anyima, Kitgum Matidi, Wol, Omiya Pachar, and Lagoro. Around 100 people were forced onto the lorry. This included those already detained in the church, as well as others who had just been rounded up. The massacre unfolded about 1 km from Namokora Centre, at a place called Wii Gweng, when some captives began jumping from the truck.

Twenty-eight people were killed at this spot. Among them was Okot’s father. Okot’s uncle, James Akena, who had been arrested with his brother, survived the massacre despite major injuries. After his escape, he lived in an abandoned house for two weeks before being rescued and taken to Kalongo Hospital in Agago District.

The smell of death hung over Namokora for weeks, until an Italian missionary priest, Fr. Tarsicio Pazzaglia, mobilised some people in the neighbourhood, collecting and burying the decomposing bodies in a mass grave, today marked with a monument. Other killings occurred away from this site, with some who had escaped the truck being pursued.

The long silence

What followed the massacre was even greater chaos, fuelled by the subsequent rebellions of Alice Lakwena’s Holy Spirit Movement and Joseph Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). For two decades, northern Uganda was engulfed in violence — marked by more massacres, kidnappings, and the mass displacement of almost the entire Acholi population into internally displaced people’s camps. The memories of Namokora were buried under years of hardship, where mere survival became an achievement.

The quest for justice

But those memories resurfaced during the 2011 general elections, when one of the survivors aspiring for LCIII chairperson of Namokora Subcounty placed the massacre at the centre of his manifesto. Charles Onen was a boy when the killings happened. His uncle, Ben Nyeko, was killed, and his parents fled with him to Kalenga (then a subcounty, now a district).

“When I went into politics in 2011, the Namokora massacre was the main item on my agenda. I told people that if you elect me, I will make sure our people who were massacred get justice. They elected me,” said Onen.

Under Onen’s leadership, the survivors and relatives of the victims formed the Namokora United Relatives of the Massacred and Survivors Association (NURMSA), officially launching it in 2012. They unanimously elected Onen as their chairperson. Their main aim was to honour the dead and seek justice for what had happened — justice they primarily hoped would come in the form of compensation.

They drafted a constitution, compiled lists of victims and survivors, and set out to lobby and agitate for justice. They also began holding annual memorial prayers, the first on August 19, 2013, reportedly attended by more than 1,000 people.

Politics

What Onen had hoped would be a turning point instead deepened local political tensions. The massacre issue was swallowed by local political feuds, which Onen believes helped keep it invisible. In 2016, he chose not to seek re-election for the Namokora LC3 seat and also stepped down as NURMSA chair.

“That [NURMSA] was the beginning of real threats to my life. I met a lot of resistance from the district chair, Luka Nyeko, and the area Member of Parliament, Henry Okello Oryem. The only person who supported me was Beatrice Anyar, then Woman MP for Kitgum. During the memorial service, I told people: ‘I am making my will today. No one should take my body to my father’s home. Let my body be buried close to the victims.’”

Ironically, one of the people he accuses — Oryem — is the son of the late President Tito Okello, has ancestral roots in Namokora, and has served in the Museveni’s government since 2001. He currently holds the position of Minister of State for Foreign Affairs (International Cooperation).

“They intimidated me. They would use anonymous numbers to send threatening messages: ‘You are fighting the government. We shall deal with you.’ They organised to remove me from power. Even leaders from my own subcounty opposed me. Government programmes were withheld from me. Even Northern Uganda Social Action Fund 2 (NUSAF 2) support did not reach us. I had to take another step. I became very tired — every day was a fight. After I was removed [from the NURMSA Chair], the LC5 chair took over but died. His vice took over, and that one dropped the initiative.”

Efforts to reach Oryem were unsuccessful, as he did not respond to requests for an interview on the matter sent through his known telephone number.

The current push

The NURMSA mantle is now carried by Uthant Okot, who lost his father in the massacre but worked his way up to become the District Agriculture Officer for Kitgum. He was elected chairperson in 2023 during the annual memorial prayers, to serve a three-year term.

“We verified and updated the lists. We have 28 who died at the Wei Gweng site, 40 killed within the subcounties, and 31 survivors. We are now spreading our tentacles. We have taken the issue to the Chief Justice, Owiny-Dollo, whom we met in June 2024; to Lillian Aber [the current Woman MP for Kitgum and State Minister for Relief, Disaster Preparedness and Refugees]; and to the DISO and the RDC — they all know our issue. Even Nobert Mao [Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs] is now in the know,” says Okot.

Expert perspectives

Dr. Stella Laloyo Apecu, Chief of the Institute of Peace and Strategic Studies (IPSS) at Gulu University and Head of the Centre of Excellence in Transitional Justice and Refugee Studies, says the government’s failure to provide reparations for the Namokora massacre reflects a culture of impunity.

“This is one of the neglected transitional justice sites in the Acholi sub-region, just like Atiak and Mucwini. It was the NRA that caused their pain, and that same institution remains in power. It is also clear that what happened was payback because this was Tito Okello’s home area. Whatever happened was intentional — not a mistake. It was a clear act of revenge.

“Because it involved the ruling government, people even fear to tell their stories. The survivors are now elderly, and some have already died. The government needs to provide reparations. It has taken far too long,” she says.

Dr. Agatha Alidri, a Senior Lecturer in the Department of History at Gulu University, and one of the researchers documenting the testimonies, says the Namokora massacre reflects the broader challenges that have shaped Uganda’s post-colonial governments and their armies.

“At the centre of this is ethnicity. The massacre reflects Uganda’s deep-rooted north–south political divide. It highlights how ethnicity continues to shape both the armed forces and the state.

“The fact that it happened in the home of a former president speaks volumes. Innocent people were killed, and the government must remain accountable. The reality is that the NRM government, whose army committed the massacre, is still in power. It carries the responsibility to ensure healing,” she says.

Will justice come?

Onen, the man who initiated the push for accountability and compensation for Namokora victims and survivors, remains hopeful that the momentum built under NURMSA will eventually yield results.

“I have invested a lot in this cause at a personal level. We prepared a position paper on the victims, and I have made sure the documentation reaches all the relevant places. I am confident that one day this will bear fruit,” he says.

While Onen remains hopeful, whether justice will come may ultimately depend on the willingness of the Ugandan state to confront unresolved chapters of its own history. For the survivors of Namokora, the passage of time has not erased the memory of what happened — only the urgency of addressing it.

William Odinga Balikuddembe is a science journalist based in Kampala, Uganda, and the Chairman of Uganda Science Journalists’ Association (USJA).

Do Humor and War Go Together? What The Global South Can Teach Us

Manar Sadkou — Tue, 21 Apr 2026 14:39:47 +0000

“Buy one, get one free” usually sounds like a good deal. But in one small theatre in London, the offer comes with a twist: the free item is a burial shroud. The audience laughs, then hesitates, then laughs again.

This uneasy laughter is not accidental. It is exactly the reaction Palestinian writer Ahmed Masoud seeks to provoke, and it reflects a broader phenomenon that researchers are only beginning to take seriously: the role of humor in the Global South.

A gap in humor studies

In 2024, the European Journal of Humor Research dedicated a special issue to this topic, featuring contributions from scholars across Asia, Africa, and South America. The issue highlights a striking gap: despite its cultural significance, humor in the Global South remains largely underrepresented in academic research.

Although the term “Global South” is often understood geographically, the editorial “Humor and Conflict in the Global South” offers a broader definition. Authors Diego Hoefel, João Paulo Capelotti, and Rujuta Date argue that it refers not simply to location, but to communities that are politically, economically, or culturally marginalized due to histories of colonialism and global inequality.

These are precisely the contexts in which humor takes on heightened significance. The contributors to the special issue highlight its many roles: as satire used to challenge authoritarian politics in Zimbabwe, as dark comedy emerging from life under siege in Palestine, and even as a political tool in right-wing meme culture among supporters of Brazil’s former president Jair Bolsonaro. Taken together, these examples paint a clear picture: humor in the Global South is not peripheral; it is pervasive, political, and deeply embedded in everyday life.

Humor as cultural resistance in Palestine

One particularly striking example of this comes from the work of Natasha W. Vashisht, who examines how black comedy operates as a form of cultural resistance in Palestinian writer Ahmed Masoud’s play The Shroud Maker.

In her analysis, Vashisht argues that humor in the play does more than just entertain. Through Hajja Souad’s cynical voice, she argues that Masoud “confronts the desensitisation of violence against Palestinians,” reclaims control of the narrative, and invites “the audience to consider the harsh reality of Palestinian life in a more digestible way.”

This balance between humor and tragedy is central to the play. Hajja Souad, an elderly shroud maker living in Gaza, uses black comedy to make sense of a life shaped by loss and conflict. Her jokes are unsettling and often inappropriate, but they are deeply intentional. At one point, she remarks that the war is “good for business,” a line that is both shocking and darkly comic.

The joke lands because of its absurdity, but once the laughter fades, it leaves behind a sense of discomfort. Rather than diminishing the tragedy, Masoud’s use of dark humor draws the audience closer to it. It forces them to sit with the violence and pain faced by Palestinians, rather than turning away from it. Dr. Vashisht contends, “laughing in the face of adversity is invaluable in coping with trauma and making life more livable.”

Writer Ahmed Masoud shares this perspective. For him, humor is rooted in everyday life. “Humor is very, very important in our lives,” he explains. “It’s a way to console yourself… and to bring back your humanity.” Growing up under siege in Gaza, he describes humor as something that persists even in the most difficult circumstances. Rather than diminishing suffering, it allows people to endure it. In this sense, humor becomes both a coping mechanism and a form of resilience, insisting on humanity in situations that often strip it away.

He also notes that this sense of humor is shaped by the region. Being geographically and culturally close to Egypt, where comedy has long been central to film and theatre, meant growing up surrounded by it. Even if the style of humor varies, it becomes part of everyday life and something shared across households and generations. It’s a dynamic I found familiar myself, having grown up in a Moroccan household where Egyptian comedies, especially those of Adel Emam, were often playing in the background.

But for Masoud, humor is not only cultural. It is also deeply personal. In recent years, he has lost many family members, including his brother. Writing, he says, has become a way of processing that grief. And while his poetry leans toward raw emotion, humor remains central to his work in theatre, where it allows him to reach audiences differently. As Vashisht’s work shows, this is precisely what allows Masoud to offer “an alternative way of discussing violence and war beyond the dominant Western narrative that marginalises the Palestinian voice.”

In bringing Souad’s character to life, Masoud does something deliberate. He humanises Palestinians in a way that many narratives often fail to do. Hajja Souad is not simply a symbol of suffering. She is sharp, irreverent, flawed, and funny. “Telling the story… is resisting erasure,” he says, describing his work as a way of pushing back against narratives that reduce Palestinians to either victims or stereotypes. Instead, he presents them as complex individuals, shaped by trauma but not defined solely by it.

Beyond resistance: Humour, power, and the politics of representation

Masoud’s work is just one example of what is often overlooked in broader discussions of humor. As the editorial “Humor and Conflict in the Global South” clarifies, the issue is not a lack of humor but a lack of attention to it. Part of this may lie in the discomfort it creates because much of this humor forces audiences, particularly in the Global North, to confront realities they are often distanced from, whether geographically or politically.

Another part of this imbalance lies in the structures that shape whose voices are heard in the first place. As the editorial notes, humor studies remain heavily dominated by work from and about the Global North, leaving many perspectives from the Global South underrepresented. This reflects longer histories of colonialism and inequality that still shape how knowledge is produced today.

At the same time, humor in the Global South cannot be reduced to a single function. While it often operates as a form of resistance or coping, it can also take on more complex and, at times, troubling forms. As the special issue shows, humor is also present in right-wing meme culture, including among supporters of Jair Bolsonaro, who served as Brazil’s president from 2019 to 2023.

In his paper on political humor in Brazil, Viktor Chagas examines how memes circulated among Bolsonaro supporters function within this landscape. A former army captain and long-time congressman, Bolsonaro rose to power on a populist, anti-establishment platform and has been associated with strong nationalist and conservative positions. Over the course of his political career, he has drawn criticism for a number of public statements about women, LGBTQ+ individuals, and minority communities, as well as for his praise of Brazil’s former military dictatorship. His presidency was marked by significant political polarisation, controversies surrounding his handling of the COVID-19 pandemic, and international concern over rising deforestation in the Amazon.

Within this context, humor also becomes a powerful political tool. Circulating widely on platforms like WhatsApp and social media, memes supporting Bolsonaro often frame political debates in simplified, emotionally charged ways, turning complex issues into easily shareable jokes that reinforce “us versus them” narratives. In doing so, they do not just reflect political divisions but actively contribute to them.

Together, these examples show that humor in the Global South is not secondary or niche; it is part of everyday life. It can help people cope, challenge power, or, in some cases, reinforce it.

And yet, as this special issue of the European Journal of Humor Research makes clear, it remains underrepresented in the very fields that seek to study it. In this contribution, what the authors hope for is a global shift in perspective, one that takes seriously the voices, histories, and lived experiences that shape humor outside of the Global North.

Masoud’s work also shows what is at stake. Through humor, he tells stories that might otherwise be overlooked, and does so on his own terms. Taking that work seriously, alongside the many other forms of humor emerging across the Global South, can help close the gap between what is studied and what is lived.

Manar Sadkou is a Bachelor student in Globalization, Governance, and Law at Karlshochschule International University, and a DDRN Intern.

List of references

Do Ethnic Chinese Malaysians Actually Speak Chinese?

Francesco Biancalana — Tue, 21 Apr 2026 14:26:15 +0000

Scholars often observed how less-dominant languages are being spoken less and less. As a result, the dominant varieties might take over, leading the world toward less multilingual societies and cultural losses. Are non-Mandarin Chinese varieties in Malaysia an analogous trend of monolingualism and cultural loss? When the British colonised Malaysia, they regarded the Malays as unskilled and unable to develop the colonial economy. Chinese and Indian immigrants were considered as labourers. These migrants brought along their community languages so that they were able to communicate and stay close to help one another. What is the current sociolinguistic situation of Malaysian Chinese communities?

Linguistic Overview

Malaysia is a federation in Southeast Asia composed of 13 states and 3 separately administered federal territories. Such vast territory is characterised by a distinct linguistic landscape, the three major ethnic groups are Malay, Chinese, and Indian. Diverse communities who gained independence from British rule in 1957. On top of that, other minority groups are further observed in everyday life such as Vietnamese, French, German, Nepali, Tagalog, Bahasa Indonesian, Korean, and Japanese. In 2020, Malaysian Chinese are the second-largest ethnic community with approximately 6.91 million members among Malaysian citizens, the so called “ethnic Chinese” or in some specific cases “Tang people” 唐人 tángrén. Identifying themselves as distinctive groups with a historical inheritance of identity, reflecting their own linguistic and cultural varieties, such as the people from the Chinese territories of Fujian, Hakka, Fuzhou, Guangxi, Xinghua, Fuqing and others. Although linguists classify Chinese language varieties as distinct languages, they are often referred to as dialects. Many of these varieties are mutually unintelligible, even among speakers within the same group. The Chinese varieties spoken by Malaysian Chinese communities include several subgroups of Min (i.e., Hokkien, Teochew, Xinghua, Hainan, Foochow), Hakka, and Yue (i.e., Cantonese).

The dominance of Mandarin among Chinese communities in Mainland China, Taiwan, Macao, Hong Kong, Singapore, and other regions has been widely reported and analysed; this article focuses on the case of Malaysia. Although some Chinese schools in various overseas communities still teach dialects. The current mainstream trend in international Chinese inheritance language teaching is to unify the use of Mandarin as the standard, the so called “Common Language” 普通话 pǔtōnghuà. With an increase in Mandarin Chinese literacy resulting from Chinese medium education, formal usage of dialects has decreased over the years and may only be used in rural churches for preaching and reading of religious texts. Chinese primary schools in Malaysia are often funded by Chinese associations and individuals, with support sometimes politically incentivised during elections by Chinese-based parties. Mandarin was introduced as the medium of instruction in the 1920s and is widely used in media, education, and increasingly among younger Malaysian Chinese. There are also newspapers, magazines, dramas, and films on television and in cinemas using Mandarin as the primary medium.

Historical and Social Frameworks

Under British rule, schools for locals and migrant children were divided according to the languages of instruction. As a result, the colonial government did little to promote national integration or foster a shared identity, and migrant communities largely remained in separate enclaves without a strong sense of belonging to the nation. The history of the racial conflicts in Malaysia began with the Chinese migrations in the 19th century and was exacerbated in 1957 after the independence from the United Kingdom. The colonial rule and the Japanese occupation let to a communist insurgency with fragile race relations. The selection of Malay, the language of the majority, as the national and official language, along with special privileges granted under the Malaysian Constitution (e.g., customary land rights) was perceived as racially biased. Consequently, the majoritarian party, United Malays National Organisation (i.e., UMNO), significantly lost parliamentary seats. While it still held a majority in Parliament, the Chinese-based opposition party claimed “victory”. As a result, the tensions between Malays and Chinese communities culminated in the 1969 racial riots. In response, Malaysian policymakers promoted Bahasa Malaysia as the national language and developed a national education system to foster cultural unity and to support the nation’s social and political development. During the 1970s and 1980s, this approach came to be known as the ‘One Language One Culture’ policy, because it promoted a single, unified national culture.

Social tensions declined in the 1990s with government support for the teaching of standardised ethnic languages as a school subject. Standardised ethnic languages, namely Mandarin for the Chinese and Tamil for the Indian, serve as the medium of instruction. The dominant socio-political influences decide the family language for communication rather than parents/grandparents. Likewise, studies have also shown that many Malay children are not speaking Malay community languages, while Indian children are not learning Telugu, Gujarati, Punjabi and Malayalam. Children who attend Chinese or Tamil medium primary schools often acquire an additional language, Mandarin or Tamil. However, Tamil medium private schools are largely absent, as the Tamil community often cannot afford this option. Consequently, many families choose not to pass on the ethnic language to children, prioritising standard languages instead.

As reported by several analysts and scholars, racial discrimination in Malaysia remains far from being resolved. Racism pervades multiple aspects of contemporary Malaysian society, including employment-related discrimination, education, economic policies, housing, and language policies. Systemic exclusion from meaningful employment opportunities contributes to income inequality, social marginalisation, and intergenerational disadvantage, in breach of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and key International Labour Organisation conventions. Research indicates that students who experience racial bias are likely to undergo trauma, leading to decreased confidence and motivation, eroding academic performance, and negatively affecting long-term social and economic mobility. Moreover, racism in the housing sector is characterised by a combination of prejudice and structural weaknesses in state and federal regulation and policy. Regarding language policy, discriminatory practices have been observed affecting Chinese minorities and non-Malay-speaking individuals within Malay communities. However, it is important to highlight that multilinguism in Malaysia is allowed and incentivised. Article 152 of the Federal Constitution states, “While Malay is the national language, the freedom to learn, use and develop the mother tongue of all communities is expressly guaranteed”. Additionally, documents such as UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity (2001) affirm the importance of cultural plurality and recognise that “All persons have therefore the right to express themselves and to create and disseminate their work in the language of their choice, and particularly in their mother tongue” (i.e., Article 5). Conversely, it has been reported how Standard Chinese is gradually taking on this role, even replacing Chinese dialects within the domestic domain.

New Generations VS Old Generation?

To determine the active use of a language, linguists analyse several sociolinguistic factors, one of the most significant being usage among young people, who can ensure the preservation of both the language and the corresponding culture. Several factors contribute to the ongoing language shift among Chinese Malaysians. A significant number of Chinese Malaysian parents send children to Chinese-medium primary schools, where Mandarin serves as the medium of instruction. However, few studies have examined how the younger generation perceives the importance of the relation between dialects and cultural heritage. At the same time, the dominance of major languages in most social and professional domains has reduced opportunities to use community languages. In the broader context, speaking Mandarin is advantageous because it allows individuals to claim membership within the Chinese community worldwide. In the past, membership in Chinese dialect groups in Malaysia was essential for survival and for business networks. Giving speakers access to cultural ideals, norms, and ways of thinking that collectively contribute to the community. However, heritage languages now have low instrumental value, compared to Mandarin. Therefore, younger generations increasingly perceive Mandarin as conveying higher social prestige due to wider versatility of the language. On another note, research suggests that younger Chinese Malaysians tend to feel more positively toward Malaysian Mandarin Chinese than toward the variety spoken in Mainland China. Indicating that the language and cultural preferences of young Malaysians may reflect a strong sense of local cultural identity rather than external influence.

Studies on older generations bring peculiar results. Not only are new generations giving up on community languages, but also parents and grandparents seem to be slowly shifting toward Mandarin. The findings indicate that participants used Chinese heritage languages in everyday lives, particularly in domestic domains, employment, religion, and friendship. However, there is a noticeable shift toward Mandarin, which is increasingly perceived and used as the primary medium of communication in analogous circumstances. Analysis of the interviews suggests that the main functional distinctions between these languages remain in communication with friends and with family members or peers of the same or older generations. Not only do middle-aged and older speakers rely on Mandarin when interacting with younger generations who cannot understand or speak Chinese heritage languages, but also with individuals from other Malaysian states who may not share the same heritage languages. This language shift is not driven by personal preference for Mandarin among middle-aged and older speakers. Rather, it reflects a pragmatic need to accommodate younger generations and others who do not speak Chinese heritage languages. Moreover, recent studies also investigated the reasons that led parents to shift to Mandarin. Exposure of children to the heritage language through having grandparents as carers and media was not effective for language maintenance. Some parents also believed that transmitting heritage languages was not considered useful. In other circumstances, children are responsible for ‘micro-language decisions’ at the family level. The choice of Mandarin and English was affirmed by the broader sociopolitical context, whereby proficiency in standard languages ensures access to educational and career opportunities.

Conclusion

It seems inevitable that Chinese heritage languages in Malaysia are going to vanish. However, these studies report that Mandarin, particularly the Malaysian variety, plays a fundamental role in Malaysian Chinese communities as a primary language in community events, everyday life, media, and the domestic domain. Is Malaysian Mandarin Chinese then a modern tool to build a sense of a common cultural identity that strengthens local culture rather than an obstacle to heritage preservation?

Francesco Biancalana is a Master student at University of Naples, Italy, and a DDRN intern

Only a limited number of schools incorporate the use of Chinese dialects, and not all schools in Malaysia offer heritage language education, particularly those outside National-Type Chinese Schools, where Mandarin is the main medium. This results in noticeable differences in parental expectations and teaching standards. As noted by Qian (2024:60), “Malay teachers and classmates dominate public schools, while Chinese teachers and classmates dominate private schools. Parents of the two types of schools have different expectations for their children’s future, with children in public schools having more chances of staying in Malaysia to further their education. In contrast, private school students are more likely to go abroad for further studies after high school.” Moreover, access to heritage languages education is uneven across communities. As highlighted in the article, “Tamil medium private schools are largely absent, as the Tamil community often cannot afford this option.” This aligns with Ting (2009:11.8), who reported that “that privately-supported Tamil schools do not exist since the Tamil community cannot afford this luxury.”

Mandarin has become increasingly important in the economic sphere. In contrast to the past “Chinese dialect groups in Malaysia was essential for survival and for business networks” (Ong, 2023:33), Mandarin is now widely used within Chinese communities
for business purposes, making it a valuable asset in the job market.

List of references

Whose Arctic? Indigenous Agency in Regional Policy Formation

Florin-Madalin Nicu — Tue, 21 Apr 2026 13:00:16 +0000

The Arctic region has increasingly gained prominence not only as an area of environmental and strategic significance but as one of the most instructive arenas for examining the limits and possibilities of inclusive international governance. At the center of this examination stands a question that is both institutional and normative: to what extent do Arctic Indigenous peoples hold genuine agency in shaping the policies that govern the region they have inhabited for millennia? This article analyzes the role of Indigenous Permanent Participants (PPs) within the Arctic Council framework, the normative foundations of their participation rights under international law, the post-2022 institutional disruptions caused by the conflict in Ukraine, and the trajectory of Indigenous Arctic governance under Denmark’s 2025–2027 Chairship.

The Permanent Participant Framework

The Arctic Council, established by the Ottawa Declaration of September 19, 1996, introduced a governance innovation that remains unique in the landscape of intergovernmental institutions: the Permanent Participant (from now on it will be abbreviated as PP) category, which accords Indigenous peoples’ organizations formal and continuous participation rights alongside the eight Arctic member states. Six organizations currently hold this status, as detailed in Table 1 in the sidebar. Together, they represent approximately 500,000 Indigenous people across the Arctic, constituting a significant share of the region’s total population of four million.

The rights conferred by PP status are substantive. The Arctic Council’s Rules of Procedure specify that PPs may address all meetings, that their consultation must precede the adoption of meeting agendas, and that they may propose cooperative activities and projects. The Ottawa Declaration stipulates that decisions are taken by consensus of the Arctic States, with full consultation and involvement of the Permanent Participants, a formulation that defines both the formal constraint on PP power and the practical leverage it generates. While PPs cannot formally block a state decision, the mandatory consultation requirement creates strong political incentives for states to accommodate PP concerns before decisions are finalized. The Indigenous Peoples’ Secretariat (IPS), operational since 1994 and predating the Arctic Council itself, provides the institutional infrastructure that allows PPs to function as genuine governance actors rather than ceremonial participants, through capacity-building, logistical support, and systematic coordination among the six organizations.

The Normative Dimension: UNDRIP and FPIC

The institutional framework of the Arctic Council must be assessed against the broader normative standard established by the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2007. UNDRIP’s most consequential provisions for Arctic governance concern Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC). Article 19 requires states to consult and cooperate in good faith with Indigenous peoples through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free, prior and informed consent before adopting measures that may affect them, while Article 32 extends this requirement to projects affecting Indigenous lands, territories, and resources. The OHCHR clarifies that FPIC requires consent given voluntarily, sought sufficiently in advance, and based on complete and accessible information, a standard qualitatively distinct from consultation alone .

The gap between this standard and the Arctic Council’s consultation-only PP framework represents the central normative tension in Arctic Indigenous governance. In practice, however, the mandatory consultation process combined with consensus-based state decision-making approximates a de facto form of influence that provides PPs with meaningful leverage over policy outcomes, even absent formal consent rights. Several Nordic Arctic states, including Norway, Finland, and Denmark, are additionally bound by ILO Convention No. 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, which creates legally enforceable consultation obligations reinforcing and extending the PP rights within the Council framework.

Policy Influence in Practice

Each of the six PPs exercises policy influence primarily through project leadership within the Arctic Council’s working groups. The ICC co-led the PAME working group project on Meaningful Engagement of Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities in Marine Activities (2021–2023), producing internationally recognized guidelines for sustainable shipping. The Saami Council’s Climate Impacts on Terrestrial Environments (CITE) project, developed with the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), established a digital platform through which Sámi reindeer herders document seasonal landscape changes, integrating traditional knowledge directly into scientific climate models. RAIPON, AIA, and AAC jointly lead the Salmon Peoples of Arctic Rivers project within the Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF) working group, linking Indigenous subsistence practices to biodiversity monitoring across Arctic river systems. The GCI leads the ArcticFIRE wildland fire monitoring project, addressing the growing threat of climate-driven boreal fires.

These roles reflect a model of Indigenous governance influence that operates through knowledge co-production rather than formal voting rights. Arctic Council assessment reports increasingly credit Indigenous monitoring data alongside conventional scientific sources: Inuit hunters have tracked changes in sea ice thickness and movement for generations, providing data that satellites simply cannot replicate. Sámi reindeer herders have documented shifts in grazing patterns that signal broader ecological disruption long before scientific surveys catch up, making Indigenous monitoring an addition to conventional science. The Council’s Strategic Plan 2021–2030 was explicitly co-developed between Arctic States and Permanent Participants, embedding Indigenous priorities into the Council’s long-term institutional vision.

Post-2022 Disruptions and Institutional Adaptation

The conflict in Ukraine in 2022 represented the most severe test of the Arctic Council framework since its establishment. On March 3, 2022, seven of the eight Arctic states announced a temporary pause in Council meetings and activities, suspending the institutional channels through which PPs exercise their governance roles. PP responses varied significantly, as documented in Table 1. The GCI and Saami Council supported the pause while insisting on continued inclusion in resumption planning. RAIPON’s endorsement of Russian military actions created a rupture in PP unity and raised unresolved questions about the representational integrity of the PP category under conditions of state political pressure.

In August 2023, all eight states reached consensus through written procedure on modalities for resuming working-group-level activities, consulting all six PPs throughout. In February 2024, Working Group meetings resumed virtually, described by ICC Chair Sara Olsvig as a key step in maintaining the full and effective participation of Arctic Indigenous Peoples. The 14th Ministerial Meeting of May 12, 2025 confirmed the Council’s institutional resilience, producing the Romssa–Tromsø Statement which reaffirmed the individual and collective rights of Arctic Indigenous Peoples and called for strengthening the capacity and project leadership role of Permanent Participants.

Denmark’s Chairship and Future Trajectories

The Kingdom of Denmark assumed the Arctic Council Chairship on May 12, 2025, with a program placing Indigenous Peoples as the first of five thematic priorities. Greenland’s Foreign Minister Vivian Motzfeldt serves as Chair and Greenland’s Arctic Ambassador Kenneth Høegh leads the Senior Arctic Officials process, meaning an Indigenous-majority territory is exercising the prerogatives of an Arctic Council Chair for the first time. Høegh has described the Chairship’s approach to Indigenous Knowledge as practical rather than symbolic, arguing that combining Western research and Indigenous knowledge produces a demonstrably better analytical and policy outcome.

The future effectiveness of Arctic governance will depend on whether the adaptations developed during the 2022–2025 crisis can sustain meaningful PP participation across the Council’s full mandate. The weakening of multilateral cooperation in the region has direct implications for SDGs 13, 14, 15, and 17, undermining the scientific collaboration and climate monitoring that underpin global environmental governance. Preserving robust Indigenous participation is not merely a question of rights fulfillment but a practical prerequisite for the legitimate and effective governance of one of the world’s most consequential and fragile regions.

Florin-Madalin Nicu is a student of the BACHELOR’S PROGRAM OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS at Eurasian National University “L.N. Gumilyov”, Kazakhstan

Table 1: Comparison of Permanent Participants — Status, Influence, and Post-2022 Positions

Sources: Arctic Council official pages, Ottawa Declaration, Iqaluit and Barrow Declarations, AC Rules of Procedure, and PP organizational websites. Admission years and formal rights from Arctic Council materials. https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org

Danish Science Festival 2026 Event – Debate on Migration and Mental Health

Manar Sadkou — Tue, 10 Mar 2026 11:17:29 +0000

Click for Danish Time: 21 April at 7.30pm-9.30pm FREE ADMISSION

Join us for an evening debate featuring presentations from researchers exploring the relationship between migration and mental health:

(1) Anthropologist, Assistent Prof. Gabriel Antonio Brown, Department of English, Germanic and Romance Studies, Centre for Culture and the Mind, University of Copenhagen. He will present Migration and Mental health in Latin America: Historical and Anthropological Perspectives.

(2) PostDoc Ahlam Chemlali, Department of Politics and Society, Aalborg Universitet. She will discuss her fieldwork on everyday life in transit and the lived experiences of migrants.

(3) Journalist Lise Josefsen Hermann tells about her own experiences reporting from the Global South. She will share insights from her work interviewing migrants for media and educational purposes, including materials used in Danish upper secondary schools. Lise Josefsen Hermann will also moderate the final debate and encourage questions from the audience throughout the event.

Please register by emailing your name to info@ddrn.dk Organizer: Danish Development Research Network (DDRN.dk) Read also: https://ddrn.dk/6773/; https://ddrn.dk/12108/; https://ddrn.dk/11706/; https://ddrn.dk/6754/

Venue: UNION, Nørre Allé 7, 2200 Cph.

What the Black Loyalists Tell Us About America

Adrian Ganic — Mon, 09 Mar 2026 11:31:57 +0000

History can be construed for political purposes, often to the detriment of marginalised groups who find themselves underrepresented in the mainstream narrative. The way history is written also determines which lessons are taken from past events. A politicised historiography risks obscuring the real mechanisms driving history, leading to an inability to act efficiently when old socio-political and economic problems arise in a new form.

One such example is the way the struggle of Black Loyalists—individuals of African descent who fought for the British during the American Revolution (1775–1783)—is overlooked in the dominant historical narrative in the United States.

The American Revolutionary War is often framed as a conflict between freedom and oppression, with the American rebels on the side of freedom—“all men are created equal”, as is stated in the Declaration of Independence issued in 1776.

Such freedom was not the experience for the 20% of the population who were enslaved. Historian Edmund Morgan, in American Slavery, American Freedom, named this contradiction the American Paradox. From that perspective, the equality of the US founders—men like George Washington—and people who looked like them depended on and was sustained by the inequality of their African slaves.

Further complicating matters, Lord Dunmore, the British Governor of Virginia, in 1775 issued a proclamation granting freedom to slaves who abandoned their masters and fought against them. Although Dunmore’s Proclamation only applied to Virginia, some estimates claim that up to 100,000 slaves from all over what was to become the United States escaped to British lines.

For Dr Tad Stoermer, External Lecturer at the Center for American Studies at the University of Southern Denmark (SDU) and Lecturer at Johns Hopkins University, the story of the Black Loyalists highlights the way history can get skewed to serve political aims. In his upcoming book, A Resistance History of the United States, the Black Loyalists are one of the case studies used to show US history as shaped by struggle. Not against outsiders such as the British, but through confrontation with the very system established after the American Revolution.

A Resistance History of the United States

According to Dr Stoermer, the master narrative of the US founding is that the state and the institutions the revolution created—the US Constitution, separation of powers, the Electoral College, etc.—are inherently good because they were founded on principles of democracy and equality; “all men are created equal”.

Both sides of the political spectrum share this view, although articulated in different ways. The conservative reading is based on the idea of Originalism, meaning that legal texts, including the Constitution, should be interpreted as they were understood at the time of adoption. For instance, the conservative-dominated US Supreme Court, in 2022, overturned Roe v. Wade, a previous decision recognising the right to abortion in all 50 states, arguing that in the original text of the Constitution, there is no mention of abortion rights. Instead, the issue should be left to the states. This perspective makes extending rights to previously excluded social groups an arduous task.

Crucially, liberal forces in the US also end up reproducing a version of Originalism. The progressive movement, even while in favour of more expansive rights and protections for minorities, often assumes, like its conservative counterpart, that the state founded in 1776 is, at its core, just. The shortcomings of the system, in this narrative, are due to malign individuals and movements corrupting the original institutions and their purpose. By accepting this “Patriot Myth”, both sides have “created a ceiling on all possible opposition”, Dr Stoermer contends.

This conclusion is not new. In An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States, the historian Charles Beard argued in 1913 that it is possible to view the US political system as an arrangement designed from the outset to protect the property rights of a rich minority by preventing majority rule and constraining the power of the state legislature from limiting gains on capital through checks and balances.

“So if the institutions are failing, if they are captured, if they in fact are operating against the rights of the people, you cannot escalate outside of them because they are inherently legitimate … All opposition has to get channelled through these pre-ordained, accepted ends. And if they don’t work, then you just have to live with the results. That is not what is shown as having achieved gains in US history,” Dr Stoermer continues.

How have gains been achieved? The argument in A Resistance History of the United States is twofold. Firstly, the book posits that most of the progress in protecting human rights in the US over time has come from resistance to the establishment, not as a result of the establishment’s inherent morality. The experience of the Black Loyalists illustrates that this tension existed from the start.

Secondly, that resistance towards what Dr Stoermer calls abusive authority is a gradual process that begins with protest and legal opposition when a government misuses its authority, escalating if the system fails to correct the injustice. Due to blocking forces within the state, such resistance takes time, and battles over particular rights—abortion, for example—may have to be fought over and over.

The story of the Black Loyalists is also instructive. To avoid re-enslavement, they were evacuated to other British colonies in North America as defeat in the Revolutionary War became inevitable. About 800 arrived in the Bahamas, where they had to struggle to maintain their freedom.

Black Loyalists in the Bahamas

“My main character, for example, Prince Williams, is enslaved. He’s freed by certificate for his military service in the British Army, and then he comes to the Bahamas, and somehow he shows up in a newspaper ad as a runaway [slave]. He has to fight for his freedom a second time,” Dr Christopher Curry, Associate Professor of History at the University of The Bahamas and author of Freedom and Resistance: A Social History of Black Loyalists in the Bahamas, told DDRN.

Prior to the American Revolution, the Bahamas were largely underdeveloped. The settlement of both Black and White Loyalists had a transformative effect. By 1790, several new islands were settled, the colony’s white population doubled (3,500), and the black population tripled (6,500).

Freedom and Resistance shows how Black Loyalists had to adapt their politics and actions depending on their local circumstances—sometimes violently confronting racial inequalities, sometimes seeking out white patronage for personal advancement, acquiring land and even owning slaves. Black Loyalists also established social and religious institutions, such as churches and schools. In fact, we know that Prince Williams eventually regains his freedom because he is listed as an owner of the property that will eventually become Bethel Baptist Church, which still exists today.

Moreover, the Black Loyalists contributed to the political development of the Bahamas. They understood the rights afforded to them as free subjects of the British Empire, using them to protect their freedom and laying the groundwork for deeper inclusivity. “There was a franchise act passed in 1833, allowing persons of colour to get elected to the House of Assembly. The decade-long struggle for that political right would not have happened if you did not have the Black Loyalists, who began the foundational work in the 1780s and 1790s, agitating for their rights in courts, demanding that they be considered free persons,” Dr Curry says.

As in the United States, the Black Loyalists have traditionally been excluded from the mainstream historical narrative in the Bahamas, which instead glorifies the White Loyalists. Dr Curry explains: “Since the White Loyalists were the ones who had access to power, wealth and most of the land, monuments and so on were built for them. Their story got told because they had the power and the opportunities to do that.”

Today, a lot of work is done to highlight the Black Loyalists’ role in Bahamian history. For instance, with the help of Dr Curry and other scholars from the University of The Bahamas, the country revised its history textbook for high schools in 2025. The new textbook incorporates recent scholarship on Bahamian history, with a particular focus on the Black Loyalists and other previously overlooked groups.

Freedom: A Tenuous Process

Above all else, Freedom and Resistance emphasises just how fragile freedom can be. In doing so, Dr Curry says, “it opens an interesting Pandora’s box to thinking about what the American Revolution actually achieved, and how freedom is often tenuous and murky when it crosses transnational borders”.

In the case of the United States, a method for going beyond the Patriot Myth could entail something similar: “If you can engage people in a conversation about what the American Revolution was really all about, you can detach that discussion from an appreciation that this nation-state [the US] is the best way to support those [liberal] principles,” Dr Stoermer says.

The American Revolution was, as the name suggests, a continental—even transatlantic—event, with battles fought in what is now the United States, Canada, several Caribbean countries, Portugal, Gibraltar, Spain, Guatemala, France, Ireland, and off the coast of North Africa. Like other major revolutions, it had many causes and outcomes, the political systems in the Bahamas and the United States being two of them.

Dr Stoermer concludes: “If you care about democracy, if you care about [liberal] principles, then you need to understand that [the US political] structure isn’t serving them. Why? Because it was not created to. That’s the conversation for me.”

Adrian Ganic is a M.Sc., THE LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE and a DDRN CORRESPONDENT

Forskningens Døgn 2026 Debat: Migration og Mental Sundhed

Arne Wangel — Sun, 01 Mar 2026 13:34:06 +0000

Tid: 21.april 2026 kl. 19.30-21.30 GRATIS ADGANG

– Kom til debatarrangement med oplæg fra forskere:

(1) Antropolog, Adjunkt Gabriel Antonio Brown, Institut for Engelsk, Germansk og Romansk, Centre for Culture and the Mind, Københavns Universitet, fortæller om latinamerikanske perspektiver på mental sundhed og dens sammenhæng med migration.

(2) PostDoc Ahlam Chemlali, Dept. of Politics and Society, Aalborg Universitet fortæller om sit feltstudie af dagligt liv i transit.

(3) Journalist Lise Josefsen Hermann fortæller om egne erfaringer fra et omfattende journalistisk virke i det Globale Syd, inklusiv interviews af migranter til brug i medier og i gymnasier. Lise opfordrer samtidig publikum til at stille spørgsmål undervejs og modererer den afsluttende debat.

Tilmelding: Send e-mail med navn til info@ddrn.dk

Arrangør: Danish Development Research Network (DDRN.dk)

Læs også: https://ddrn.dk/6773/; https://ddrn.dk/12108/; https://ddrn.dk/11706/; https://ddrn.dk/6754/

Sted: UNION, Nørre Allé 7, 2200 Kbh. N.

As the World Falls Apart, Social Media Brings PeopleTogether

Yiling Lyu — Sun, 01 Feb 2026 22:04:39 +0000

How the TikTok Ban Sparked an Unexpected Digital Migration from the U.S. to China

In January 2025, growing political debate in the United States over a possible ban on TikTok triggered strong reactions among many American users. Given TikTok’s scale, with approximately 1.9 billion users worldwide and around 170 million monthly active users in the United States, the platform had become deeply embedded in everyday digital life. In response, some users moved to Rednote (Xiaohongshu), a social media app widely used in China for sharing everyday experiences, advice, and personal stories. This move was widely discussed online as a form of protest against perceived government interference in personal media choices. Many of these users referred to themselves as “TikTok refugees,” a label that quickly circulated across platforms and media coverage. Although the proposed ban was delayed several times and no official decision had been made until now, the uncertainty alone was enough to encourage people to experiment with new digital spaces. This episode offers a useful starting point for understanding how social media can bring ordinary users from different countries into contact, even during periods of political tension.

When Downloading Rednote Became a Trend

Although many Chinese netizens questioned whether the term “refugee” was appropriate, it nevertheless became a widely used buzzword in 2025. In the days following the announcement of a possible TikTok ban, Rednote rose to the top of the U.S. App Store download rankings and soon reached leading positions in more than seventy other countries. Much of this visibility was amplified by overseas Chinese users, who shared screenshots of local App Store rankings from different countries, highlighting Rednote’s rapid rise to the top. This wave of participation was often driven by curiosity or by a desire to follow what was perceived as an emerging American-led trend. Notably, this wave of participation unfolded alongside ongoing criticism of the United States and its domestic politics, the coexistence of criticism and imitation points to a broader pattern: even as the United States is frequently contested, it continues to occupy a central position in global digital culture, shaping platform dynamics far beyond its borders.

This dynamic also challenges the common assumption that China is digitally isolated, an image often repeated in Western media narratives. In practice, Chinese users have access to extensive information networks of their own. Although platforms such as Twitter (now X) or Instagram are not widely used within China, users actively rely on domestic platforms such as WeChat, Douyin (the domestic version of TikTok), Weibo, and Xiaohongshu, as well as on connections with overseas Chinese communities, to stay informed about global events. Through these channels, international trends are quickly noticed, discussed, and shared.

The widespread circulation of App Store screenshots by overseas Chinese users illustrates how global platform shifts become visible within China, even without direct reliance on Western social media. This suggests that information flows into China through multiple social and social routes, allowing users to engage with global developments in ways that are often overlooked.

What Happened After People Joined? Greetings Across Oceans

From early 2025 to the present, the hashtag #TikTokRefugee on Rednote has accumulated over 4.59 billion views, showing that interest in this cross-border encounter did not disappear after the initial wave. Among the most widely shared moments was a simple post by an American father, who uploaded a photo of himself and his child and added only a short greetings. The comment with the most likes came from a Chinese family who replied to an almost identical heartwarming family photo with a simple ‘Hi!’. This quiet exchange, built around everyday. family life rather than politics or performance, moved millions of viewers, many of whom described feeling unexpectedly emotional.

These small gestures of recognition, became a powerful reminder that direct, human contact had been rare for a long time. For many users on both sides, this was not just curiosity but a first real glimpse into each other’s ordinary lives.

When Everyday Life Became a Reality Check

As these interactions continued, conversations gradually moved from greetings to everyday life. Informal comparisons emerged around work, housing, healthcare, and education, with tuition fees drawing particular attention. American usersthat annual undergraduate tuition can range from roughly $25,000 to $45,000, and with living expenses total costs often reach $35,000–$68,000, placing many under long-term student loan pressure. These figures surprised many Chinese users, who had assumed U.S. education was both accessible and affordable.

Meanwhile, Chinese users described their own expenses, noting that tuition at public universities in China is typically around ¥5,000–¥10,000 ($700–$1,400) per year. For many Chinese users, especially those who had never traveled abroad, these firsthand exchanges complicated the long-held image of American life as uniformly comfortable and prosperous. At the same time, American users expressed surprise at the relative affordability of daily life in Chinese cities and certain social services.

Such comparisons frequently provoke not heated debate, but quiet reflection. They reveal how distance and imagination profoundly shape perceptions of foreign societies, while everyday dialogue can swiftly alter these entrenched notions.

What is Remaining now?

Nearly a year later, are these “TikTok refugees” still on Rednote? Most have since left, while a smaller number remain active. Yet the importance of this episode lies less in how long users stayed than in the lingering effects it left behind. As a long-time Rednote user, I witnessed this process firsthand. In the earliest days of the migration, the platform lacked even basic translation functions, reflecting its orientation toward a largely domestic audience. Within a short period, Rednote introduced updates to support cross-language communication, including translation tools and English subtitles for uploaded videos. At the same time, many Chinese users and influencers began adding English subtitles to their own content on their own initiative, making an effort to communicate with new international viewers.

For a brief period, the platform took on a distinctly festive atmosphere, as users from different countries interacted closely and shared details of everyday life. These encounters had lasting effects, especially for Chinese and American users who had never traveled abroad. Ordinary posts about work, housing, family life, and personal finances revealed realities that differed from long-standing assumptions about life in other countries. Rather than reinforcing stereotypes, these exchanges introduced a more grounded understanding of foreign lives, showing how brief moments of everyday interaction can quietly reshape perceptions long after the initial excitement has faded.

Do you still remember the families I mentioned earlier in this article? Guess what? They met each other in Shanghai just recently! Seeing them together, sharing smiles and greetings across continents, was a simple yet profound reminder of what ordinary people can achieve when given a chance to connect. Moments like this, born out of curiosity, small gestures, and everyday interactions, show that even when the world feels divided, human connections can bridge gaps that politics or geography cannot. If the world could hold more moments like this, I think we would love it even more.

The following link is an interview about a 58-year-old Mary Jo from the United States became a so-called “TikTok refugee” when the platform faced a potential ban. She joined a Chinese social media platform and shared her first experience communicating in Chinese, moved to tears by the warm responses from local users. This unexpected encounter marked a turning point in her life. https://web.facebook.com/watch/?v=824507233741102

Yiling Lyu is a Master of Arts student at University of Copenhagen with a Major in African Studies, and a DDRN intern.

What is the Relationship between Neutrality and Safety in Humanitarian Contexts?

Jakub Machart — Sun, 01 Feb 2026 22:04:04 +0000

Humanitarian and development aid, provided and funded by wealthy countries such as Denmark, are central elements of the process of development. Denmark is a champion in per capita expenditure dedicated to official development assistance (ODA), ranking 4th worldwide with 0.71% of its Gross National Income (GNI) spent on ODA. At the same time, globally, humanitarian space is shrinking, and organisations active within the field are facing increasingly more precarious conditions, with direct impacts on their staff located in countries receiving aid. 2024 became the deadliest year on record for humanitarian aid workers, and 2025 is set to top this record once statistics are concluded. The biggest Danish NGO Danish Refugee Council alone has mourned the loss of 4 partners and 2 staff members in Gaza and Ukraine last year.

We often hear that the humanitarian space is shrinking, but we rarely directly link this to the loss of lives in the contexts of provision of humanitarian aid. There are mechanisms in place to ensure safety of humanitarian workers, however, they only have limited efficiency. The humanitarian principles of independence, impartiality, neutrality and humanity, that a large number of international NGOs subscribe to, are in place to ensure not only efficiency and morality of humanitarian work, but also to increase the safety of aid workers in precarious contexts. The humanitarian principles are not simply a moral compass guiding humanitarian action, they are powerful enablers of provision of humanitarian aid; neutrality in conflict areas ensures access to affected populations, and independence from political and other agendas helps ensure trust with all parties. According to the ICRC, they are pragmatic tools more than anything.

Research from 2012 confirms that if humanitarian organisations are perceived as neutral and impartial, the risk of attacks or kidnappings of their staff decreases. The topics of neutrality and impartiality, and consequently of safety and security in the aid sector thus remain essential. Guth and Messerschmidt, authors of 2025 Thesis on Managing Risk and Security: How Humanitarian Organisations adapt in conflict zones, published at Lund University recently sat down with DDRN for an interview.

In their thesis, based on interviews with workers in the humanitarian sector, they identified two overarching themes related to safety: understanding of contextual factors, and politicisation of aid. Neutrality is one of core humanitarian principles, and apart from ensuring efficiency, it also extends to support safety for humanitarian workers from being targeted. Guth remarks that when it comes to neutrality, it is much more about perception, than reality: “I feel that it really depends on how people perceive you. Even if your actions are neutral, the context in which you operate might not see them that way. For example, if you treat civilians and military personnel equally, some may still perceive your organisation as political because you are engaging with both sides. I think it comes down to a question of definition. MSF, for instance, says we are neutral because every human being is equal in our eyes and everyone can receive help. Others might argue, however, that this is not neutrality, because you are still, in a way, choosing a side. This framing is very challenging for organizations, because it shows that, in practice, it is extremely difficult to act truly neutral.” This is an extremely important notion, as neutrality is not an inherent attribute, but rather a fragile, negotiated perception that has to be advocated for, and maintained, in order to achieve acceptance through neutrality.

For organisations not to be targeted during a conflict, an important, though context-dependent, element is visibility. Many aid agencies choose to mark their vehicles and facilities to signal their role as aid providers, or notify conflicting parties about their planned movements, hoping that clear identification will be respected. Such measures can enhance safety when armed actors comply with international humanitarian law (IHL), but in some cases, visibility can also exacerbate the risks. Under IHL, all parties to an armed conflict must distinguish between civilians, including humanitarian personnel, and combatants, and must not intentionally target humanitarian workers. Attacks on such personnel can constitute serious violations of IHL. Yet acceptance and visibility are only one part of the equation; Respect for the law is the other. In today’s conflict environments, adherence to IHL is inconsistent, and organisations cannot rely on their protected status. Although risks are inherent, recently, we have seen increasing instances of both state and non-state actors targeting aid workers.

According to Messerschmidt, the question of whether to increase or reduce visibility “is really context and conflict dependent.” She notes that organisations first assess “what this kind of conflict is about and where the risk is coming from.” In Ukraine, for instance one organisation chose not to mark its vehicles at all because “it’s more safe” in a context where threats come directly from state actors. Guth similarly stresses that visibility is not inherently protective: at times it is beneficial to be recognised by civilians, yet in other situations “you need to just blend in completely.” Visible equipment can even undermine trust; “if you have a helmet and you’re more associated with the military, it can be dangerous,” she explains. Both researchers observed that every organisation they interviewed had grappled with this dilemma.

For Messerschmidt, the visibility question is inseparable from a broader erosion of international humanitarian law. Marking facilities and vehicles is meant to offer legal protection: an attack on a clearly marked site could be identified as a potential violation of international humanitarian law. But this protection only works if parties respect the law. As she puts it, organisations increasingly fear that “the law is not respected anyways,” and that even when accountability is technically possible, “no one really cares anymore.” This legal vacuum leaves humanitarian actors navigating visibility choices with no guarantee that either approach, being seen or staying hidden, will keep them safe. This distinction reflects the classic humanitarian security model of acceptance, protection and deterrence: humanitarian principles primarily enable acceptance, while IHL functions through legal deterrence and accountability. Without accountability, humanitarian principles function as risk-management tools rather than protections

Humanitarian actors’ ambivalence toward visibility also reflects a broader frustration with the absence of effective accountability mechanisms in the international system. As was noted during the interview, organisations can only mitigate risks up to a point. Beyond that, their safety ultimately depends on political actors and states that bear responsibility for upholding IHL. Yet, according to the researchers, many respondents stressed that violations are seldom followed by meaningful consequences, and that the international community selectively enforces IHL depending on the context. This uneven response not only undermines protection for civilians and aid workers, but also risks signalling to other conflict parties that attacks on humanitarian personnel will go unpunished.

Messerschmidt points out that under international humanitarian law, states are formally responsible for violations they commit, yet they are unlikely to hold themselves accountable. While other states or international bodies may impose sanctions or refer cases to international courts, she notes that such measures “rarely happen in practice.” For her, this gap between legal obligation and political enforcement lies at the heart of the problem: without consistent external accountability, humanitarian organisations are left to manage risks that ultimately stem from failures in the international system rather than from their own operational choices.

To conclude, humanitarian neutrality can only contribute to safety if it is both perceived and respected. Throughout the past year, neutrality has come under increasing strain due to the politicisation of aid and the persistent lack of accountability at the global level. It remains essential to humanitarian operations, but its ability to support safety depends less on organisational conduct than on the political and legal environments in which humanitarian actors operate.

Jakub Machart is a BSc. student in Development Studies at Lund University, Sweden, and is a DDRN intern.