Climate action – DDRN

Youth at the Table: How Young Advocates Engage with Climate Diplomacy

Sofia Kiryttopoulou — Mon, 03 Aug 2026 13:25:01 +0000

Climate change is often discussed through science, emissions targets, and environmental disasters. Yet behind global climate action lies another, less visible process: climate diplomacy. Broadly, climate diplomacy refers to the negotiations and cooperation between countries aimed at addressing climate change through international agreements, policy commitments, and collective action.

As climate decisions shape the future of younger generations, youth participation in these discussions has become increasingly important. While many associate youth climate engagement with protests and activism, young people are also participating in policy consultations, advocacy networks, educational initiatives, and climate diplomacy forums.

To better understand what youth engagement in climate diplomacy looks like in practice, I spoke with the hosts of Young, Loud and Green, Natalia Vradi, and Ioanna Giakoumopoulou, two young women from Greece who are actively involved in climate advocacy. Through conversations with climate experts, researchers, and youth leaders, the podcast explores climate diplomacy, sustainability, and civic participation, while making these discussions more accessible to younger audiences.

How Two Young Researchers Found Their Path into Climate Diplomacy

Both interviewees described their entry into climate-related work as closely linked to their academic experiences, but also to the people and environments that shaped their interest in the subject.

Natalia Vradi studied Political Science and Public Administration before completing a master’s degree in Southeastern European Studies. She explained that her interest in climate diplomacy was first sparked during her undergraduate studies, when she attended a course taught by a relatively young professor specializing in the topic. She emphasized that the professor’s age and teaching style made a significant difference in how engaging and accessible the subject felt, particularly because climate diplomacy is often perceived as distant or overly technical. This early exposure helped her recognize climate change not only as an environmental issue, but as a political and diplomatic process shaped through negotiation and international cooperation.

Ioanna studied International Relations with History and also holds a master’s degree in Southeastern European Studies. Her engagement with climate-related work developed more gradually through her broader interest in youth participation, civic engagement, and what it means for young people to be actively involved in political and social processes. Interestingly, she also noted that her deeper involvement in climate diplomacy was influenced through her collaboration and connection with Natalia, highlighting how peer networks and shared academic environments can play a key role in shaping professional pathways.

Taken together, their experiences underline the importance of accessible education and relatable mentorship in climate-related fields. Having educators and peers who are close in age or who actively engage with the subject in an approachable way can significantly lower the barrier to entry for complex topics such as climate diplomacy, making them feel more tangible and relevant to younger students.

What youth participation in climate diplomacy looks like

When asked what youth engagement in climate diplomacy looks like in practice, the hosts said that, unfortunately, it is still largely associated with protests and street activism. They noted that while movements such as Fridays for Future have played a crucial role in raising global awareness of the climate crisis, protest remains the most visible and accessible form of engagement for many young people.

At the same time, they explained that youth participation is not limited to activism in the streets. Other forms do exist, including policy consultations, youth delegations at international conferences, participation in climate forums, research contributions, and engagement through youth-led networks and educational initiatives. However, they emphasized that these forms of participation are often less visible and do not necessarily translate into real influence within formal decision-making processes.

When asked about this gap between participation and influence, they pointed to what is often described as “youth washing.” They said that institutions frequently highlight the presence of young people in conferences, consultations, or advisory spaces as proof of inclusivity. However, in many cases, this presence does not necessarily lead to meaningful involvement in shaping decisions.

As they explained, the core issue lies in the difference between being included in a space and having actual decision-making power within it. While youth participation is increasingly acknowledged in principle, it does not always result in concrete policy impact.

Barriers to meaningful participation

Several structural barriers were identified as limiting young people’s ability to engage effectively in climate diplomacy.

Funding was highlighted as one of the most significant obstacles. Much youth participation depends on unpaid or voluntary work, which excludes those without financial support or flexibility. Age was also discussed as a persistent barrier, with younger participants often not being taken as seriously in formal institutional settings.

More broadly, the interviewees pointed to a lack of clear mechanisms through which youth contributions are translated into policy outcomes. Even when young people are consulted, their recommendations are not always reflected in final decisions.

Youth Networks Beyond Borders

When asked whether they could point to examples of youth-led initiatives that have had a tangible impact in climate spaces, the hosts referred to a discussion they had in one of their episodes from their podcast. In the episode, they spoke with Michael Kakande, a United Nations Climate Change COP Impact Maker and the Founder and Chairperson of Resilient40 (R40), a Pan-African and diaspora youth-led network focused on climate resilience, adaptation, and climate justice across Africa.

They described Resilient40 as a network that brings together young professionals from across the African continent and diaspora to amplify youth voices that are often underrepresented in global climate discussions. According to the interviewees, its work is particularly focused on ensuring that African perspectives are meaningfully included in international climate negotiations, especially in key policy areas such as climate finance, adaptation strategies, and loss and damage.

In their view, initiatives like Resilient40 illustrate that youth engagement in climate diplomacy is not confined to local activism or awareness campaigns. Instead, it increasingly takes the form of structured, cross-border collaboration that connects young people across regions and institutional contexts.

They added that this reflects a broader trend in climate advocacy: youth participation is becoming more global and interconnected, shaped by networks that operate across both the Global North and Global South. Rather than acting in isolation, young climate advocates are increasingly engaging in transnational spaces where knowledge, strategies, and political demands are exchanged and amplified across borders.

Misconceptions About Youth in Climate Governance

The interviewees addressed a recurring misconception about youth participation in climate governance: the assumption that young people lack the expertise, experience, or technical knowledge necessary to contribute meaningfully to policy discussions. They firmly challenged this notion, arguing that many youth-led initiatives comprise highly informed participants who actively engage with complex areas like climate diplomacy, negotiation processes, and international frameworks. In their experience, young leaders are often deeply embedded in research, advocacy, and policy-oriented debates, making them well-versed in both the scientific and political dimensions of climate change.

To combat this skepticism, they use their podcast to directly showcase the sophisticated capability of the youth movement. The podcast highlights the sophisticated professionalism of the youth movement, featuring, as Ioanna noted, “fantastic guests, who are so involved in this and so passionate and well educated.” By centering these conversations, the podcast proves that young climate actors are highly informed, serious leaders who deserve a seat at the table.

This effort to shift the narrative extends to the Youth Climate Diplomacy Forum itself. Ioanna highlighted that the Forum delivers “top-tier conferences and content” entirely produced by individuals “under the age of 35,” showcasing the undeniable professionalism and active engagement within the youth climate movement.

Ultimately,the interviewees stressed that the issue is not a lack of competence among young people, but rather a structural tendency to undervalue their contributions. Even when youth are present in formal settings, their input is not always treated with the same seriousness as that of older or more established actors, creating a gap between participation and recognition.

A Source of Hope: The Next Generation of Climate Engagement

When asked whether the future of youth climate advocacy and diplomacy offers genuine hope or if the movement is destined to stagnate, the interviewees pointed directly to the surging momentum of grassroots engagement.

For them, hope is not an abstract concept, but something visible in the sheer volume and sincerity of the young people getting involved. They noted that the next generation of advocates is not merely “showing up for the pictures,” but is driven by a deep, authentic interest in systemic change. There is an undeniable strength in numbers, evidenced by the rapid growth of youth organizations and the massive turnout at local initiatives.

This momentum is particularly vibrant on a local scale. In Athens alone, a booming ecosystem of youth-led solidarity initiatives has emerged. From youth-run magazines and massive tree-planting events to beach cleanups and climate-conscious fashion swaps, the sheer variety of active projects offers a daily dose of optimism. Social media has played a vital role in this expansion, making it easier than ever for young people to discover a clothing swap one day and a coastal cleanup the next.

Ultimately, they agreed that climate engagement has grown exponentially over the past few years, largely because the crisis itself has become impossible to ignore. As they poignantly noted, it is both a blessing and a curse: while the severity of the crisis forces people to action, the reality of climate change is now as simple and undeniable as opening a window and looking outside. Yet, in the face of that reality, the rapid proliferation of new, youth-led initiatives remains their greatest source of hope.

From Presence to Power

Youth engagement in climate governance has evolved far beyond the boundaries of traditional street protest, turning into a highly strategic and professionalized movement. Through the experiences and insights shared in this interview, it is clear that despite facing steep structural barriers like funding limitations and the persistent threat of “youth washing,” young advocates are operating with a sophisticated level of technical expertise and cross-border solidarity. The sheer momentum of these grassroots initiatives shows that the next generation is no longer just asking for a seat at the table; they are actively reshaping the dialogue. In the face of an escalating crisis, their deeply informed engagement provides a vital reminder that meaningful climate action is impossible without recognizing youth not just as observers, but as essential partners in driving real policy change.

*Special thanks to Natalia Vradi and Ioanna Giakoumopoulou for sharing their time, experiences, and vital insights into the future of youth climate diplomacy.

Sofia Kiryttopoulou is studying for a Bachelor’s Degree in Balkan, Slavic and Oriental Studies. Specialization: Politics and Law, at University of Macedonia, Thessaloniki, Greece.

Climate Change and the Risk of State Extinction: A Challenge for International Law

Sofia Kiryttopoulou — Fri, 24 Apr 2026 11:50:20 +0000

Climate change is usually discussed as an environmental or economic problem. For some countries, however, it represents a far more fundamental challenge: a threat to their continued existence as states. Rising sea levels, coastal erosion and environmental degradation are already affecting several low-lying island countries, particularly in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

For states such as the Maldives, Tuvalu and Kiribati, climate change is not a distant scenario but a present reality. If sea levels continue to rise during the twenty-first century, parts of their territory may become uninhabitable or even disappear entirely. This possibility raises a primary legal question: what happens to a state if it loses its territory?

The Crisis of Traditional Statehood

International law has traditionally assumed that states are stable territorial entities. Under traditional international law, a state is defined by the criteria established in the 1933 Montevideo Convention: a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states. Modern legal theory further emphasizes independence and the effective exercise of authority over a specific geographic area.

The climate crisis challenges this assumption. International law has historically dealt with the disappearance or transformation of states in political contexts such as war, annexation or state succession. The idea that a state might disappear due to environmental change is largely absent from existing legal frameworks. If a state were to lose its entire territory, it is unclear whether it could continue to exist as a subject of international law.

Small Island Developing States at Risk

The states most exposed to this risk belong largely to the group of Small Island Developing States (SIDS), a coalition of island and coastal countries that face structural vulnerabilities due to their small land area, geographic isolation and strong dependence on coastal ecosystems. According to the United Nations Office of the High Representative for Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States, these states are among the most vulnerable to climate change despite contributing minimally to global greenhouse gas emissions.

Many SIDS consist of coral atolls or low-lying islands where the highest elevation is only a few meters above sea level. As a result, even relatively modest sea-level rise can lead to coastal erosion, saltwater intrusion into freshwater supplies and the loss of habitable land. These pressures are already affecting communities in the Pacific and Indian Oceans and are expected to intensify throughout the century.

Because their territory is so limited, SIDS often have few options for internal relocation. This makes them particularly vulnerable not only to environmental degradation but also to the legal uncertainties that may arise if territorial loss accelerates.

Survival Strategies for Vulnerable States

In response to these risks, governments and scholars have begun exploring a range of potential strategies aimed at ensuring the survival of states threatened by climate change. These strategies generally fall into three broad categories: territorial adaptation, population relocation and legal innovation.

Territorial Adaptation

One approach focuses on preserving habitable territory through large-scale adaptation projects. These measures include coastal defenses, land reclamation and the construction of artificial islands designed to withstand rising sea levels.

Some island governments have already invested heavily in such initiatives. In the Maldives, for example, extensive land reclamation has been used to expand and elevate artificial islands such as Hulhumalé, a reclaimed island developed as a climate-resilient urban hub and built roughly two meters above sea level to reduce flooding risks. Experimental floating infrastructure projects have also been proposed as potential long-term solutions.

While these engineering solutions may help maintain habitable land and delay environmental pressures, they require significant financial resources and technical capacity. For many vulnerable states, implementing such large-scale projects remains a major challenge.

Planned Relocation and Mobility

A second strategy focuses on the relocation of populations as environmental conditions gradually deteriorate. Relocation may take place within national territory where possible, but in some cases it may involve migration to other states through bilateral agreements.

Some governments have already begun exploring long-term relocation options. Kiribati, for instance, has pursued policies aimed at preparing its population for international mobility through education and labor migration programs, often described as a strategy of “migration with dignity.” These initiatives aim to ensure that mobility occurs gradually and voluntarily rather than as a sudden humanitarian crisis.

Although relocation strategies can help protect affected populations, they raise complex questions about citizenship, political identity and the continued functioning of state institutions.

Even when relocation is carefully planned, it exposes a critical gap in International Law: individuals forced to leave their homes due to climate-induced territorial loss currently lack clear legal protections, because they do not meet the criteria set by the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. The Convention requires a “well-founded fear of being persecuted” on grounds such as race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, a standard that neither environmental disasters nor rising sea levels satisfy. This is why the term “climate refugee” has no formal status in international law.

As a result, individuals displaced by the physical disappearance of their home states are denied the same legal protections or rights to asylum as political refugees, leaving their fate subject to the discretionary policies of host nations. This legal invisibility reflects a broader “crisis of identity” in the field: while the physical reality of displacement is undeniable, formal legal structures remain rooted in a pre-climate era, failing to provide a collective security framework for populations whose sovereign bond to their land has been severed by nature rather than politics.

Legal Continuity Without Territory

A third strategy involves the development of legal frameworks that would allow states to maintain their international legal personality even if their territory becomes uninhabitable.

Recent diplomatic initiatives suggest that such ideas are beginning to enter international practice. In 2023, Tuvalu signed the Falepili Union Treaty with Australia, which includes provisions recognizing the continuing statehood and sovereignty of Tuvalu despite the long-term risks posed by sea-level rise.

In parallel, scholars have proposed additional legal approaches, such as preserving existing maritime boundaries even if coastlines retreat. These discussions are closely linked to the interpretation of maritime rights under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which governs the establishment of maritime zones.

Such proposals seek to ensure that vulnerable states retain control over their maritime resources and maintain their status within the international community even under changing environmental conditions.

Rethinking Statehood in the Age of Climate Change

None of these strategies alone provides a complete solution. Territorial adaptation may only delay environmental pressures, relocation raises difficult political and social questions, and legal innovations still require broader international recognition.

What the experience of vulnerable island states demonstrates is that climate change challenges some of the most basic assumptions on which the international legal system has historically been built. The traditional link between territory, population and sovereignty may no longer be as stable as previously assumed.

For this reason, the growing risk of climate-induced state extinction is not only a concern for a small group of island states. It represents a broader challenge for international law and the international community as a whole.

As sea levels continue to rise, the central question may not simply be whether certain territories will disappear, but whether international law can evolve quickly enough to ensure that the states and populations affected by these changes are not erased from the global order.

Sofia Kiryttopoulou is studying for a Bachelor’s Degree in Balkan, Slavic and Oriental Studies. Specialization: Politics and Law, at University of Macedonia | Thessaloniki, Greece.

One Century of Arctic Governance: Cooperation, Sustainability, and Emerging Geopolitical Strains

Florin-Madalin Nicu — Tue, 21 Apr 2026 14:00:01 +0000

The Arctic region has increasingly gained prominence as an area of global strategic, environmental, and socio-economic importance. Given its already fragile ecosystems, diverse Indigenous cultures, minerals, and other valuable, unexploited natural resources, the Arctic has become a central focus of international governance efforts. Arctic policy encompasses the strategies, agreements, and institutional frameworks developed by the eight Arctic states, namely Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Iceland, Canada, Russia, and the United States, in collaboration with international organizations and non-governmental actors, to regulate and manage the region.

Throughout the past century, the Arctic has experienced progressive landmark treaties, national policy strategies that acted as various environmental awareness policies, scientific assessments for further conservation, and advocacy reports that have influenced the evolution of Arctic governance and the bonding role of the region to serve as a point of convergence among various great powers as well. These documents reflect shifting global priorities, including territorial administration, resource utilization, environmental preservation, and the recognition of Indigenous rights. This paper examines key policy milestones from early twentieth-century agreements to contemporary cooperative frameworks. Particular attention is given to three interconnected themes that have shaped Arctic governance: environmental protection, Indigenous rights, and economic development. Collectively, these themes demonstrate the transformation of the Arctic from a geographically remote and politically contested region into an important arena for international cooperation and sustainable governance.

Early Foundations of the Arctic Policy

The Svalbard Treaty should be regarded as one of the main attempts to establish Arctic policies, as this treaty not only changed the perception of various actors over the Svalbard region, which previously was regarded as a no man’s land, but it also attributed to Norway full control of the region with the condition of preserving the region as it is relevant for the Arctic. Initially, the Svalbard Treaty was signed by 8 most relevant countries in the region and outside of it at the given time, which include: the USA, the UK, India, Denmark, France, Italy, Japan, Norway, the Netherlands, and Sweden. Relevant articles that enshrine the extent to which Norway is entitled to ownership, to engage in different activities, and what kind of responsibilities the state should bear throughout their proceedings, under the quality of Norway being the inheritor of these lands, are stipulated in articles 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8. The article 9 and 10 can be regarded as cornerstones for turning the region into an economic, non-militarized, and environmentally protected zone meant to be accessible, firstly to all great and regional actors for cooperative purposes and then for others who would be interested in being involved. The article 10 also introduced the possibility for Russia to join at any given time after the moment of ratification, proving flexibility and integration to multilateral commitments from the signatory majority of that time.

Later, in 1970, the Arctic witnessed further individual commitments meant to protect the Arctic. The Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act represents a foundational instrument in the development of modern Arctic governance and has significantly influenced subsequent regional cooperation mechanisms, including agreements negotiated under the Arctic Council. By establishing stringent pollution prevention and regulation standards, and other norms that enforce a direct liability over the subjects to which these provisions were applicable, the Act anticipated key principles later embedded in Arctic Council frameworks, particularly the emphasis on environmental protection, emergency response coordination, and sustainable maritime activity (https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/a-12/fulltext.html).

The Act’s precautionary regulatory approach contributed to the normative development of cooperative environmental governance reflected in the 2011 Arctic Council Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue, the 2013 Agreement on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response, and the 2017 Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation. These agreements collectively reinforce state responsibility for multilateral engagement and commitment, which also included environmental risk management and cross-border emergency coordination, all of which align with the regulatory philosophy established by the Canadian legislation.

Moreover, the Act helped legitimize expanded coastal state jurisdiction in ice-covered waters, a principle later codified in international law and reinforced through Arctic Council policy coordination. As a result, the legislation served as an early model demonstrating how national environmental regulation could shape regional governance norms and facilitate multilateral cooperation in the Arctic.

By the late 1980s, shifting geopolitical conditions created new opportunities for Arctic cooperation, particularly on transboundary environmental issues. A decisive turning point occurred in 1987 when Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev delivered the Murmansk Speech, proposing the Arctic as a zone of peace and advocating expanded cooperation in environmental protection and scientific research. This initiative directly encouraged Finland to promote multilateral environmental governance in the region.

These efforts culminated in the 1991 Rovaniemi Declaration and the establishment of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS), adopted by the eight Arctic states. Although non-binding, the AEPS created the first structured framework for circumpolar environmental cooperation. It identified key environmental threats, emphasized shared responsibility for ecosystem protection, and formally incorporated Indigenous participation through observer and later Permanent Participant roles. The creation of specialized working groups institutionalized scientific monitoring and policy coordination, establishing operational mechanisms for regional governance.

The AEPS provided both the political momentum and institutional architecture necessary for the creation of the Arctic Council in 1996 through the Ottawa Declaration. Building on AEPS structures, the Council expanded cooperation beyond environmental protection to include sustainable development, resource management, and Indigenous knowledge integration. Collectively, these initiatives transformed ad hoc diplomatic engagement into a formalized governance system, positioning the Arctic Council as the central forum for multilateral Arctic cooperation.

Growing geopolitical tensions have strained Arctic cooperation. Following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, collaboration within the Arctic Council was largely suspended, weakening cooperation in all sectors, including environmental and Indigenous governance mechanisms that previously defined Arctic stability. Although limited technical cooperation has resumed, diplomatic coordination remains restricted, while increasing military activity threatens long-standing environmental monitoring and emergency response frameworks.

Recent developments within the Kingdom of Denmark and Greenland demonstrate both risks and opportunities. Denmark’s 2025 Arctic Council chairmanship stresses international law and cooperative governance, while Greenland’s updated foreign and security strategy seeks stronger Indigenous and regional representation in Arctic decision-making.

Maintaining Arctic cooperation is therefore essential. Preserving multilateral governance safeguards fragile ecosystems, supports Indigenous communities, and prevents geopolitical escalation in a region critical to global climate stability.

The weakening or potential collapse of the Arctic Council would directly affect SDGs 13, 14, 15, and 17, undermining the scientific cooperation and coordination over a wide range of activities, including climate monitoring and biodiversity protection. The Council supports projects funded by millions annually, including over 40 initiatives financed by Canada alone. The European Union has also committed significant resources, including €15 million for Arctic observation systems and broader climate research programs worth €93.5 billion.

The future effectiveness of European climate and sustainability policies may therefore depend on whether multilateral Arctic governance can adapt to geopolitical tensions while maintaining scientific and environmental collaboration. Assessing the opinion and vision of field experts is imperative to analyze how IGOs and other high-level officials should steer their policies for preventing isolation and drawbacks in the related domains of activity that have the Arctic region as the core subject of political, social, cultural, environmental, and economic interest.

Florin-Madalin Nicu is a student of the BACHELOR’S PROGRAM OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS at Eurasian National University “L.N. Gumilyov”, Kazakhstan

Humor Can Help the Climate Crisis? You Must be Joking!

Nilüfer Khudaykulov — Wed, 31 Dec 2025 15:22:57 +0000

We have spent decades finding technical solutions for the climate crisis. Yet, emissions have kept rising, and climate policies fall behind the cultural, political and social behaviors, unabling to provide sufficient responses. Our shared aspirations might be bold, yet our efforts fall far short of what is required. If we are to come together in a display of collective heroism to save the planet, we need to ask: what can unite us to try? It might be the laughter.

Massih Zekavat has been an Alexander von Humboldt postdoctoral fellow at Europa-Universität Flensburg in Germany and a researcher at the University of Groningen, Netherlands. He has spent years researching the integration of humor and satire in the climate discourse.

According to Zekavat, humor could be an effective tactical and rhetorical tool that can bridge intention and action, build a shared culture, and help hold different actors accountable for real change.

Despite the seriousness of the threat of the climate change, actions like changing consumption patterns or challenging polluters have not been completely achieved. People often feel powerless, overwhelmed, or guilty, especially when the scale of change requires ‘individual responsibility’ and rests on the shoulders of ordinary citizens alone.

Massih’s work pushes environmental psychology beyond models that focus on individuals and toward a systematic, culturally informed approach. He argues that humor has a unique power for collective mobilization: “If you want something to cohere people together, to create a community, if you need collective action that goes beyond holding a sign on your own in a city square, humor might help.”

Humor can offer a psychological bridge. Climate communication usually makes people feel scared or desperate. However, humor and satire let us confront uncomfortable truths together and confront those in positions of power and influence, in a world where companies and policymakers have greater impact than average citizens.

Parrhesia is of Greek origin. It means speaking truth to power, candidly and frankly. In the past, there were always some parrhesiastes, particularly in Athenian democracy, who spoke truth to the king without fear of repercussions, often jokingly and by playing the jester.

“It is a situation where somebody who is less powerful talks back to power, somebody who is more powerful, and tells them the truth. Like when I address Frans Timmerman, saying, ‘hey, what you’re doing is messing things up. Instead of trying to make people change, why don’t you do something about Shell? Or when I confront Shell, Tata, Amazon, or Elon Musk.’ So, this is one of the functions of satire. Satire has been traditionally associated with speaking truth to power… It is one of those discourses that facilitates expression when there is an imbalance of power in a conversation.” Zekavat adds.

“There is no symmetry in the power relationship between individuals and corporations or policy makers… You need a rhetorical device that facilitates bridging this power asymmetry… satire could be more effective than any other form of language.” Zekavat says. Humor and satire have given a level of protection to those without power for centuries. We need to laugh, and in laughing, we refuse to be silenced.

The laughter we overlooked

When Zekavat shifted his humor-focused research from politics to environmental issues in 2018, he found little scholarly attention to the role of humor. Many people were either sceptical of the climate crisis or unconvinced that humor could contribute to climate action.

One of the reasons that humor is sidelined is the assumption that it trivializes the crisis. “The main concern is that the climate crisis is something very serious. Humor is not serious. So if you treat climate crisis humorously, you’re reducing the seriousness of the topic. But this is not necessarily the case.” Zekavat says.

Utilizing humor for addressing environmental crisis is a newfangled concept, even for academics and activists. “Usually academics, particularly in the humanities, lag behind creative artists,” he notes. “Creative writers do something, and then it takes critics a decade to acknowledge it. There are comedy shows, cartoons, novels, and short stories out there that are humorous or satiric and deal with environmental crisis, but critics have not been engaging with them that much.”

In his book Satire, Humor, and Environmental Crises, published in 2023 by Routledge, he analyzes the influence of humor and satire in mainstream media, in such works as The Simpsons, Last Week Tonight with John Oliver, and New Yorker Cartoons, to examine the relationship between humor and pro-environmental attitudes and collective behaviors.

He argues that climate communication needs a serious overhaul. Strategies proposed so far by policymakers and researchers tend to assume a “one-size-fits-all” audience. However, people do not respond to those environmental messages in the same way. Their behaviors and attitudes are heavily formed by cultural background, class, age, and their identities.

He proposes primarily to recognize and understand different groups, and then tailor the pro-environmental messages, such as narratives and multimodal texts, to where they stand. Effective climate discourse should speak to what people value, not what they are told to value.

This is where humor leads in. It is a gateway for an effective communication strategy to engage different groups and make messages more relatable. It also has the potential to assist individuals in coping with the psychological impact of a crisis, simultaneously reducing the gap between intention and action.

Detecting the target of the joke

When considering the root causes of these disasters, we usually encounter a huge gap in the damaged caused by companies and individuals. Zekavat states that the climate crisis is not something that is caused by an individual, nor can it be addressed by an individual. The scope of the crisis is much larger. “You cannot really compare my carbon footprint to that of the Pentagon or to that of Amazon… Me deciding not to use plastic straws is very different from the EU banning the use of plastic or disposable dishware”.

An Oxfam study found that the lifestyle of 50 of the world’s richest billionaires produces as much carbon dioxide as the average person would in 300 years, with them taking, on average, 184 private jets a year and spending 425 hours in the air. Additionally, the use of luxury yachts by them is equivalent to the level of carbon emission that an average person would produce in 860 years.

A new report also concluded that more than 70% of the world’s greenhouse gas emissions have been caused by only 100 companies since 1988. Most of these companies are supported by investments of billionaires, such as Shell, ExxonMobil, BP and Chevron.

Yet, policymakers often point at ordinary people to “do better”. Recycle more, use paper straws, and buy green products. This narrative, Zekavat argues, carries a colonial and classist tone, ignoring the agelong lifestyle of indigenous people and many other communities. “I’m not comfortable with this for many reasons. It has colonial and imperial presumptions. It has a hierarchical epistemology… it is usually: ‘I know what is best, you don’t know, so I tell you what to do.’”

It also distracts people from structural and systemic issues. “It disproportionately blames the individuals compared to institutions, politicians, or corporations. So what it essentially does is it facilitates the perpetuation of the status quo,” Zekavat says.

It is a vicious circle that we continuously find ourselves in, fighting for clean air to breathe and a land we can still call home before it sinks. This crisis is packaged and presented so well that we see ourselves as the culprits, striving to reduce our individual carbon footprint through guilt and despair. Meanwhile, a powerful group remains largely unnamed, the ones in tailored suits who hold high shares in fossil company stocks, just stepped off their third private flight in this week and will most probably take his spaceship to other planets when there is nothing left here.

Nilüfer Khudaykulov is a Master student in International Politics and Governance at Roskilde University, Denmark, and a DDRN intern.

Click to read the second part! The Emotional Path We Take for Climate Change

The Emotional Path We Take for Climate Change

Nilüfer Khudaykulov — Wed, 31 Dec 2025 15:21:32 +0000

Have you felt that we have failed to address environmental crises? If so, you may be experiencing anxiety or guilt feelings while you hunt for alternatives to flights for your dream trips. Or perhaps, you have stopped giving such importance to it, convinced there is little left you can do to save the planet.

This article continues our exploration from “Humor can help climate crisis? You must be joking!”. In this second part, we turn to insights from Massih Zekavat’s forthcoming second book, Leveraging Satire for Environmental Advocacy, discussed during an exclusive DDRN interview.

For years, climate advocacy has relied on a single powerful emotion: fear. Images of melting ice caps, raging fires, and flood disasters are intended to shock us into action. Yet this urgency does not seem to be effective. Zekavat argues that it has reached its emotional threshold and began to often produces paralysis, rather than mobilization.

This paralysis does not stem from ignorance; rather, it is partly rooted in an emotional paralysis. It means that despite knowing all about climate change, we feel powerless to mitigate it. In his second book, one of the points Zekavat sheds light on is the denialism and quietism through apocalyptic narratives. Through these narratives, we tend to have the illusion of living in the “end times” and denying ecological urgency as a coping mechanism. The missing link, he proclaims, is material engagement, and one way toward this is looking into the culture industry, where satire plays a pivotal role.

“The main psychological mechanism behind apocalyptic narratives is fear… and overexposure to fear can also lead to negative impacts on it. It can cause eco-anxiety, eco-distress, and essentially apathy…which might lead to political inaction and inertia.”

Apocalyptic narratives often portray the end of the world as it is distant, far away in time and place. When our daily lives appear normal, surrounded by trees and blue sky, people do not feel threatened, as the imagined end does not match the daily observations. Climate change, however, is not spatially or temporally distant; it is here now. The planet is indeed deteriorating, but not in the way we expected from myths or movies. “Instead of using apocalyptic narratives… we should use narratives that facilitate speaking power to truth for people whose voices have been silenced,” Zekavat says.

Satire enables us to illuminate the aspects of individual and collective behavior that environmental psychology overlooks, including the power dynamics ingrained in class, race, gender, and material inequality.

When coping becomes complicity

Climate policies, particularly within the European Green Deal, have long prioritised resilience, adaptation, and coping. Zekavat warns that this maintenance can preserve the status quo, rather than challenge it. “You are making sure that the status quo goes on… we can still dig up fossil fuels, still burn them, still make money out of that. And someone else will pay the price.”

That “someone else” is rarely the ones who benefit from fossil fuels. It is the communities in Africa, Middle East, or other countries already burdened by environmental injustice; it is the global majority. “This is essentially what resilience and coping come down to,” Zekavat remarks critically.

“We have empirical data that uncertainty emotions could be more effective, and shame is one of those emotions that could be induced by satire,” he explains. “Satire is again a very strong rhetorical means of creating shame and indignation.” He contends that what we need is not better coping, but an actual disruption. And holding the powerful to shame can spark real transformation.

Within or against nature: a story of ambitious Homo Sapiens

Anthropocene is described as the geological period in which human activity has become as dominant as much as other geological forces. It is a time when mountains can be destroyed not only by earthquakes but also by mining companies. The term is famously used by the literature to indicate the level of adverse impact of humans on the planet. However, it carries significant flaws.

Zekavat points out that the term blames Anthropos, targeting humanity as a single, unified entity. It ignores the staggering inequality of who caused the damage and who suffers from it. “It doesn’t really differentiate responsibility,” he argues. “The responsibility of Senegal, for example, as compared to the Netherlands, China, or the US – both in creating the climate crisis and in their capacity to address it – is not even comparable.”

The second flaw is that Anthropocene often reflects a colonial, imperial perspective. Much of climate fiction pictures New York or Florida being submerged in movies, yet “Pakistan was actually submerged. A third of this country was underwater two years ago in the summer, and nobody talks about that. It’s not even something that might happen in the future; it is something that actually happened. It is a part of the lived experience of those.”

This supposedly universal “we” in climate storytelling needs to be questioned. In response, Zekavat persuasively embraces using the concept of Chthulucene, allowing us to reconsider the interconnections between the species in nature. He states that the framing of words is essential, giving an example of the shift between ‘global warming’ to ‘climate change’, which incrementally eliminated sceptics and denialists. Anthropocene, however, still obscures responsibility.

Two major misconceptions in climate communication

Zekavat identifies two persistent misunderstandings in climate advocacy:

“If we inform people, they will change”

This assumption misrepresents how human behaviour works. Smokers, for example, are fully aware of the health hazards, but it does not help them change their behavior. Knowledge alone does not lead to action. Likewise, behavior can change without information, such as through propaganda or nudging, which is a term used to get people’s attention gently, by placing small bars of chocolate near the cashier in supermarkets, for instance. “If you want to change energy consumption behavior… change the architecture. People won’t even notice how their behaviour changed, but it will change.”

“one-size-fits-all”

As elaborated in his first book, Satire, Humor and Environmental Crises, climate campaigns must reflect the diversity of habits in different communities around the world, since environmental behaviors come with some degree of abstinence, giving up travel, meat, and convenience. As might be expected, not everyone has the same capacity for sacrifice.

Humor provides a solution to both of these misconceptions. It simultaneously engages audiences on cognitive and emotional levels, making it exceptionally potent. It is also very context-dependent, culturally specific, and deeply tied to who delivers the message and who is targeted. “It reaches the audience at two levels, cognitive, rational, and emotional. So it’s not just giving information cognitively. It’s not scientific writing. There’s also an emotional, visceral, affective, imaginative aspect to that,” Zekavat says.

It is important to underline that humor should not belittle the crisis; instead, it should belittle the deniers. “Instead of poking laughter at the climate crisis, you poke laughter at people who deny the existence of the climate crisis.” Zekavat cautiously reminds us that satire must be used responsibly, as it can reinforce prejudices or punch down on vulnerable groups if misdirected. However, if it is used wisely, it becomes a “moral weapon”, as he aptly describes.

“We must be more open to approaches and strategies that are not established. It doesn’t mean that if something is not as popular or as frequently seen as others, it doesn’t work. Maybe nobody has dared to try them.” Satire is one such overlooked approach, in alternative to apocalyptic narratives. He hopes that environmental campaigns will change their focus from targeting ordinary people to confronting political and corporate powers. “This is a systemic, political issue… not an individual opinion choice.” He concludes.

Our planet’s decline is slow and unjust, and it is driven by choices we can still change. Who we shame, who we comfort, and whose responsibility we point at matters.

Nilüfer Khudaykulov is a Master student in International Politics and Governance at Roskilde University, Denmark, and a DDRN intern.

Life between Machines and Trees: Local Voices under Deforestation

Nilüfer Khudaykulov — Sun, 09 Nov 2025 07:57:18 +0000

How can a rich forest be protected from illegal logging, while safeguarding the communities who rely on it for survival? Two expert groups from Cambodia and Brazil share how memory, community knowledge and technology can shape sustainability and partnership amid the conflicting interests of resident communities and loggers.

Cambodia and Brazil are two different countries, yet their stories intersect at crucial points by the logging of their abundant forests and the presence of indigenous people living there. These forests are commonly being targeted by governments and private enterprises for commercial interests. It poses a significant threat to the environment and the livelihoods of resident indigenous people.

Prey Lang in Cambodia

Cambodia set a world record for deforestation with which 1.5 percent of the country’s forests disappeared in 2021. Additionally, the country lost 31 percent of trees in protected areas since 2000, equivalent to 2.7 million hectares.

Prey Lang is the largest forest in Cambodia and the last remaining major lowland rainforest in the Southeast Asia. It is home to 250,000 indigenous Kuy people, 530 species of plants and animals. Protecting Prey Lang is vital not only for the ecosystem, but also for Kuy people who rely primarily on the land for survival, as well as 22 threatened species registered in the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN)’s Red List.

Prey Lang has incrementally been the victim of illegal logging and deforestation due to its profitable luxury woods, agricultural potential for demanded plantations such as sugar, rubber and cassava, and presence of minerals such as timber. The forest is also aspired for further mining explorations for iron and gold. Considering the profits accrued by concession companies from Prey Lang, the environmental importance of the forest and livelihood of Kuy people has been systematically overshadowed.

The Prey Lang Community Network (PLCN) took place to protect the forest from demolition with voluntary collaboration of indigenous community members. It mainly focuses on collection and dissemination of the information about illegal logging activities. PLCN has been utilizing smartphone technology with the Prey Lang App created in 2013 to collect data such as photographing and pinpointing the location of logging activities. The app also enables recording interactions with authorities, threats, and violence, as well as ascertaining climate-related figures.

The monitoring app is a geographic citizen science application that integrates with satellite GPAs and runs on smartphones. It was designed through a partnership between the University of Copenhagen (UCPH), PLCN, and local and international NGOs.

Besides restraining illegal logging in Prey Lang, the project team also induce advocacy by collection of data through the UCPH. They teach the Kuy people to use a social media platform, so that their reports can be the voice of them to draw public attention, like a citizen journalist.

Territories surrounding Trombetas River in Brazil

In this context, Brazil shares a similar pattern with Cambodia. Mining activities on the Trombetas River, mainly conducted by the fourth largest bauxite producer Mineração Rio do Norte (MRN), have adversely impacted the local quilombolas who face challenges in securing legal rights over the territories Alto Trombetas I and II. They have been neighbours of MRN and experienced firsthand the severe environmental effects of its operations for decades. The mining territories are federally conserved units by the government, which overlap with the territorial rights of quilombola communities.

The territorial conflict between quilombolas and conservation units for mining activities obstructs land titling. Furthermore, the continued distrust between the government and indigenous groups necessitates more time for the hearing process rather than for information and decision steps.

Julia Marques Dalla Costa, who served as deputy coordinator of the National Quilombola Environmental Licensing Team at The Instituto Nacional de Colonização e Reforma Agrária – INCRA (National Institute for Colonization and Agrarian Reform): “… it’s a process. We have to believe in the process, and we have to be very mindful with everything, every step on the way. So you became exceptional by time, you know, exempting yourself from the government or the image of the government they built over time by their traumas. Then you build the hearing again. By hearing, you try to understand. So you kind of became the common ground between them.”, she further explains how angry and frustrated quilombola people were initially.

“We are allies of the quilombolas because we are responsible for the titling of their lands. So they were like, you left us, you abandoned us. We were here for 10 years without any notice, without any resources.”, she adds what was crucial that worked for them to build the trust, through consistently being the same people that they can contact to, “we always try to keep with our word. So we have to be very cautious with what we are saying, what we are committing to”.

The indispensable pillars: collaboration and understanding

Community involvement is a highly effective strategy to cope with environmental issues. It is cost-effective, and capable of comprising a sustainable foundation for all parties involved. However, it requires multidimensional approach that incorporates social, institutional and economical aspects. When these aspects are absent, communities encounter problems that endanger their livelihoods and safety. Therefore, it is vital for both Kuy and Quilombola people that the education and peacebuilding process is handled in a multidimensional and sustainable way.

The project team in Prey Lang also facilitates peacebuilding between the community and the government through peace dialogues. They bring the communities into dialogue, both with local authority and moving forward with the national levels. They also held several forums that brought together key actors in this forest sector, including indigenous groups, NGOs, private sector representatives, and officials from the Ministry of Environment to present their priorities and the support they need. The forums were crucially important for relevant key actors to illustrate the issue and reach a common ground.

Integrating faith for biodiversity among the community was another step taken for sustainable peacebuilding and biodiversity protection. Forest is a sacred place for indigenous groups – a place for spiritual practices. Additionally, collaborating with monks and other religious leaders to hold tree ordination and tree planting eased the process for Prey Lang. “Religious leaders hold moral authority, and they are able to mobilize communities for tree planting. For example, if we have reforestations initiatives, they mobilize the community and engage with authority. Authorities are more collaborative when it comes to religious leaders so that they join the efforts. And this kind of initiative also creates more understanding and trust between the communities and authorities.” the project team member explains.

“We hope that at the end of the day, the communities, the states and those who work in the forest sector can understand each other and collaborate to protect the forest.” the team member says.

Indigenous People and Local Communities (LCIPs) hold deep ecological knowledge, and they have great wisdom in forest protection, with a long-standing tradition of passing on their knowledge from one generation to the next. For this reason, it is extremely helpful for researchers and states to integrate the science knowledge with traditional knowledge and recognise the crucial role of LCIPs in forest and biodiversity conservation.

Julia refers to Bronislaw Malinowski’s pioneering quota to approach this particular issue: “We should have the native point of view… it’s very basic but important and core lesson in anthropology that you have to connect to understand why that person or group having that position is making those statements, what is their point of view towards that problem, that institution or someone.”

“A first step for them to trust you. Imposing your own information on them, look, you feel in this way, you need this… As an outsider, you just need to bring their own knowledge, own experiences, values and feelings. Combine and prioritize their own experiences over your solutions.” Julia concludes.

Malinowski’s theory claiming to “grasp the native’s point of view, his relation to life, to realize his vision of his world” sheds light on the path to partnership with local communities in response to the damage caused by mining companies in Prey Lang and the territories surrounding the Trombetas River over the years. It is therefore vital to empower local people, not only for their fundamental rights, but also to facilitate collaborative efforts to preserve the biodiverse landscapes that are home to hundreds of species.

Nilüfer Khudaykulov is a MSc student in International Politics and Governance at Roskilde University and a DDRN intern

Reducing Chemical Pesticides in Agriculture in Nepal – a Planetary Health Issue

Lise Josefsen Hermann — Sun, 29 Jun 2025 15:26:14 +0000

Integrated pest management and nature-based solutions is an urgent matter to reduce the dangerous use of chemical pesticides in the production of most of our food worldwide. Nepali Professor Sundar Tiwari from Bharatpur, Nepal, dialogues with Danish Erik Jørs, associate professor in occupational medicine.

How can the use of chemical pesticides be reduced drastically worldwide without affecting the production? What consequences do these pesticides have for farmers and consumers health? And how does it affect the planetary health?

That are some of the points discussed by the Nepali researcher and professor Sundar Tiwari from Agriculture and Forestry University in Bharatpur, Nepal, who has been specializing for years in biological pest control and sustainable agriculture. In a recent recorded podcast, a part of the Nordic Talks series, he dialogues with Danish Erik Jørs, a senior physician and associate professor in occupational medicine at Odense University Hospital and University of Southern Denmark, who a large part of his working life has spent leveling global inequality in countries like Nepal, Uganda and Bolivia, focusing on pesticide poisoning in several parts of the world.

Nordic talks are dedicated to addressing the UN’s sustainable development goals and is a series of talks addressing the biggest global challenges through conversations with some of the brightest minds in the Nordics and the counterparts from around the world.

Sundar Tiwari has been working with biological pest control methods and has also been involved in research in Nepal focusing on nature-based solutions as an alternative measure to pesticides. And then he has been engaged – together with Erik Jørs – in training of farmers.

Erik Jørs has been working with pesticides since 2001, where he started a collaboration with Bolivia due to a high number of human poisonings by chemical pesticides. Later on, he started out in Uganda and Nepal.

“The extensive use of chemical pesticides is of global concern, because people are facing many challenges in agriculture and especially in the intensive agriculture they are using high dose of pesticides, which are going to affect our whole ecosystem, society, farming communities including environment and biodiversity, “ says Sundar Tiwari and continues: “People are affected by cancer in many Nepalese villages and we have been facing many environmental challenges – we are losing our aquatic biodiversity. We cannot see fish in our rivers and streams. We are losing our bees, which are very important for pollination, and also some butterflies. We’re losing these good insects, and that’s going to affect our ecosystem and our biodiversity,” explains Sundar Tiwari.

Erik Jørs has especially been focusing on farmer’s health related to the use of chemical pesticides: “…because every time they go to the field and they might have contamination of the chemical pesticide. In short run the farmers they might experience vomiting and other health related issues. But in long run this pesticide contamination and everyday consumption of the pesticide is going to affect their whole health system including cancer, blood cancer, breast cancer etc. These are some health-related issues in case of the farmers,” explains Erik Jørs.

But he is also very worried about the environmental affectation: ”It’s actually planetary health that we are talking about. It’s not only affecting the health of humans – causing deaths and poisonings, nervous diseases, cancer, problems with the fertility and so on, but it’s also affecting the fertility of the land and the preservation of the land where we are growing our food. So, if we can’t grow the amounts of food we want due to problems pesticides killing the good insects which are maintaining the ground fertile, then we will have problems with the with the lower harvests and maybe even starvation,” says Erik.

According to Sundar Tiwari, the majority of farmers in Nepal are still practicing traditional farming, but there is a big challenge or pressure created by many people migrating from the rural to urban areas, where people are focusing on increasing the production. Traditional farming has many good practices to learn from:

“They have their own practice of the cultivation like they use a local variety. They use mixed cropping, intercropping and they have a very good mechanism of maintaining the biodiversity. So, they also use some bio pesticide in local level using many plant materials together and they make a solution and they spray. So, this is a kind of biological pest control,” says Sundar Tiwari.

An important and well-known tool in the work of reducing the use of pesticides is the so-called integrated pest management – a principle promoted for years by UN’s Food and Agricultural Organization, FAO. Both Erik and Sundar have been working according to those principles.

“We teach farmers as far as possible to avoid chemicals. It’s cheaper for them and often it’s not necessary to spray with pesticides. But farmers need to know for example, if the insects in their field are beneficial or harmful to the crops, so they don’t spray the beneficial ones. And then they should use traditional methods, good farming practices including selection of the best seeds, how to water the plants when they are growing and give maybe traditional manure from the cows or whatever they have available to them,” says Erik Jørs and Sundar continues:

“So, we are integrating all methods, whatever available to the farmers. For example, seed selection. If you have a good seed, it is going to be germinated very well, and it’s can be very healthy. And the healthy plant is not going to be attacked as easily by insects and diseases. If there is no insects and diseases, then farmers are not using chemical pesticide. Similarly, if you have a very good fertilizer in the soil, for example, potash or some silica, so if you integrate into the nitrogen and that crop is very healthy. That is integrated pest management. We integrate all methods so that we can reduce the pest population in the farm. The nature is full of biological control, but we are wiping out that biological control agent from the nature because of the chemical pesticide,” says Sundar Tiwari.

Also, with a consumer perspective there is a great advantage of trying to avoid the chemical pesticides in our food production: “We have tested different food items and, in many cases, we have actually found the maximum residue levels of pesticides (by WHO) have been surpassed in many cases. That means, that there is a danger for human health. Not only for the farmer spraying but also for the consumers. Nowadays we are talking a lot in Denmark about the residues of pesticides in our drinking water. And in many of the wells, pesticides have poisoned our drinking water and now we are drinking our water but contaminated with pesticides,” tells Erik Jørs.

“In Bolivia we found that children who have been exposed to pesticides during their mother’s pregnancy they do not perform as well as children without that pesticide exposure during pregnancy. So, we also have to think about the future generation when we talk about pesticides and prevention of poisonings. An important issue if we want farmers to reduce the use of pesticide and use pesticides safely when needed,” says Erik – who underlines, that at the from his perspective, it is not necessary to make radical changes and it is important to take social issues into account:

“Integrated pest management doesn’t say no to pesticides, but they say minimize the use and do only use pesticides if you are in the danger of losing your crop. Many farmers in low-income countries cannot afford to lose their crop. Then they will starve and eventually suffer a lot from that. So, they have to reach out for the ultimate solution. If they can’t find another way to combat the pest or they have a big attack of pest and they can use pesticides. But they must protect themselves and they must use the pesticide in a proper manner,” says Erik.

“It’s necessary with interdisciplinary work collaboration to minimize this problem. Many people, many organizations have been working trying to reduce pesticides, but I think it’s also very important that government prohibit the most toxic ones and demands that the farmers gets educated and take courses in proper handling of pesticides. Many low-income countries want to be able to feed themselves and be able to grow crops that can be exported. But you have to put rules on that. For example, in the EU, we control the food coming from Africa, or other parts of the world to see if they comply with the maximum residue levels that we have in the EU. I think it’s important with some kind of political strong engagement. And we have the FAO, we have the WHO, they have their guideline on this. But it’s difficult because there’s also a strong lobby from the industry producing pesticides,” says Erik.

He mentions a responsibility from the financial system: “In some cases, loans to farmers are tied to the use of pesticides. The bank wants to reassure that the loan is paid back. So, they don’t want the farmer who take a loan to grow this crop, to lose it. So, the deal is: Okay, you can have the loan, only if you guarantee that you buy this packet of pesticides too. That is an unhealthy policy to promote. So political leadership is crucial if we want to reduce the use and amount of pesticides used, “ says Erik Jørs.

And it is urgent to make a shift in the commodities production worldwide, because as many scientific studies documents, it is not sustainable if we just continue business as usual: “If we continue this farming practice we will face a human, biodiversity and environmental crisis. Research also says pesticide use contributes to increase of non-communicable disease to human beings. In the end it will affect the food and nutrition security. And if our environment is polluted, our water, air and soil is polluted, then what happen? Then you cannot get a good future. Our children will be affected. Future generations will be affected. We will be sick. The whole ecosystems will be affected by chemical pesticides,” warns Sundar Tiwari.

“If we don’t minimize the use of pesticides, then we’ll end up with problems like infertile soils, lack of bees to pollinate our plants and grow the crops. We will end up with many more poisonings especially in low-income countries. So, I really think it’s time to make a big effort and swap to more ecological farming. Not saying that we totally can avoid the use of pesticides, but at least we can minimize it a lot;” said Erik Jørs.

Lise Josefsen Hermann is a freelance journalist who has been reporting from Latin America for 15 years. She has received grants from Earth Journalism Fund, GABO Foundation, Journalism Fund, National Geographic and Pulitzer among others. Her work has been published in media like Al Jazeera, BBC, Danwatch, Dialogue Earth (former China Dialogue), Deutsche Welle, Danish Broadcasting Corporation, El País, New York Times, and Undark Magazine.

Nepali researcher and professor Sundar Tiwari from Agriculture and Forestry University in Bharatpur, Nepal, who has been specializing for years in biological pest control and sustainable agriculture in dialogue with Danish Erik Jørs, a senior physician and associate professor in occupational medicine at Odense University Hospital and University of Southern Denmark.

https://ddrn.dk/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/Nordic-Talks-Jors-og-Sundar.mp3

Charcoal Consumption in East Africa: A Climate Change Dilemma

Adrian Ganic — Wed, 16 Apr 2025 07:53:19 +0000

The fight against climate change demands that nations decarbonise their energy grids, but this transition puts contradictory pressures on many Global South countries. For instance, charcoal is the primary energy source for households in Tanzania and Uganda, dictating the social and political economy of livelihoods, gender relations, informal economies, ethnic relations and private sector growth. A sudden transition away from charcoal risks overlooking such complex dynamics.

To investigate these structures, Copenhagen University has partnered with Makerere University, Uganda, and St. Augustine University of Tanzania—receiving Danida funding for a four-year project (2023–2027) called Charcoal Conflict in Climate Change’s Decarbonisation Dilemmas: Knots of Livelihood, Nutrition, Communities, Gender, Migration & Energy in East Africa. The project includes extensive fieldwork in Tanzania and Uganda and aims to shape ideas on climate justice and global policies by centring voices from the Global South.

The initiative is led by Ole Wæver, Professor of Political Science at Copenhagen University and head of the Centre for Resolution of International Conflicts (CRIC).

DDRN recently interviewed Dr Susan Mlangwa, post-doctoral research fellow for the Charcoal Conflict project and lead investigator, Tanzania, part-time lecturer at St. Augustine University, and deputy country director for Tanzania at the Clinton Health Access Initiative, as well as Dr Sylvie Namwase, lead investigator for Uganda, lecturer at Makerere University School of Law, and post-doctoral research fellow at the Human Rights and Peace Centre (HURIPEC), Makerere University.

This is the second research collaboration between Dr Wæver and Dr Namwase. They previously cooperated on a project on militarisation, sustainable growth and peace in Uganda, which concluded in 2024.

The importance of studying charcoal consumption in Tanzania and Uganda

Q: So, Dr Susan, you notified the team about the call for proposals?

Dr Mlangwa: Yes. Some of my colleagues, actually past colleagues of my late husband, would always send me calls for such projects. And, this time, when they shared a call, I remembered that Sylvie was working in Denmark. So why not give it a try?

After finishing my PhD, I worked with the Johns Hopkins University Center for Communication Programs as the head of research and evaluation and continued to work on projects advancing [human] agency in terms of [disease] prevention behaviour. Not only through what we get from institutions, NGOs, hospitals and educators. But also what the peoples’ prevention initiatives themselves say about those interventions. Rather than imposing a change in social behaviour, you should actually work with the people themselves to understand how it can work better.

When we conceived this project, I saw myself looking at the same area of my expertise: How are the people navigating energy transitions? Are they doing it through what they’ve been told to do, or is there a level of agency going on?

Dr Namwase: It’s a lot that we are unpacking. It is the dilemmas of the energy transition within the broader context of climate change and we are exploring these issues from a multidisciplinary perspective.

It’s three universities, and each team is bringing a unique perspective. The University of Copenhagen, specifically the Centre for Resolution of International Conflicts [CRIC], brings the international relations perspective. Then we have the Makerere University School of Law, specifically under the Human Rights and Peace Centre [HURIPEC], bringing the law and policy perspective. St. Augustine University in Tanzania provides the sociological, anthropological, conflict and geographical lens to the problem.

By acknowledging that, yes, we have a problem. We are destroying our environment. And, yes, on the other hand, there is a problem if the voices that are working for good, although unintentionally, end up enacting results that are oppressive. We need an intermediate discussion, discourse. This is why this project is important. It will provide the space for that discourse.

Q: Do you have any preliminary findings?

Dr Mlangwa: It is a bit too early to be conclusive. So, the preliminary results will basically only be from observations in Uganda.

We are seeing that these things are really intertwined at the micro level. You see that communities are heavily relying on firewood and charcoal due to affordability and accessibility. But when you look at the regional and national level you find things like government bans on charcoal production and attempts to cut deforestation that create economic hardship for those dependent communities. We see governments using the police in policy enforcement to regulate charcoal production. But, at the same time, it encounters things like corruption and weak institutional capacity. At the macro level, charcoal production contributes to carbon emissions and climate change. This is also a fact.

The way I see the data, it’s material that, on the one hand, is systemic and, then, on the other hand, is nested—meaning that it builds on each other. If you want to come up with policies which will work you have to do a multi-level analysis. This needs an interdisciplinary approach.

“If the government is going to impose a total ban on charcoal, it’s almost as if they just want to kill us”

Dr Namwase: We have been very deliberate in speaking to cultural institutions and then also to communities that practice particular cultural aspects tied to the question of production and use of charcoal vis a vis preservation of specific tree species. We are also being deliberate on language to maintain the local language and references. And, of course, we are also very intentional about reflexivity.

In fact, early on, before we went to the field, we had a methodology and epistemological seminar as a multidisciplinary team, where each side shared key aspects to look out for that are common in their own fields so that we could all learn from each other.

In summation, the initial findings [from the legal perspective] are that the government and the state are using top-down militarist approaches, which are resulting in injustice and dispossession for quite a number of people. It is not engaging and offering alternative and affordable alternatives for these communities, and to a large extent, women are being particularly affected by these bans. Once the bans are put in place, what happens, as Dr Susan said, is that charcoal production does not stop. It continues.

Because of the additional burden of bribing the numerous police and military officers you find on the way, [charcoal] ends up becoming expensive once it reaches Kampala. That then affects the profit margin of women [selling food at markets] and the youth, by the way, as well. Youth are also engaging in businesses that rely on charcoal. For instance, Rolex-making. I don’t know if you know about Rolex. It’s a special street food here in Uganda, which consists of chapati and fried egg. It is a very popular food among the youth because it’s cheap and affordable.

And there is no room for people to negotiate and say, “Maybe give us more time” or “Where are the alternatives?”. In fact, what we found in quite a number of cases is that there is a sense of despair. Because on two or three occasions, we’ve had respondents saying that “if the government is going to impose a total ban on charcoal, it’s almost as if they just want to kill us”.

Research Aims

Q: Is the aim for your research findings to be translated into policy?

Dr Namwase: There is flexibility in what we can produce in terms of outputs. So, for instance, policy briefs are not out of the question. We should also have policy briefs at the end, with which we engage the key stakeholders—the ministries [in Tanzania and Uganda].

Then the whole point, of course, is also getting people to move away from charcoal because, ultimately, we want to protect the environment. Uganda and Tanzania are losing a lot of forest cover. But we want it to be done in a fair way, in a way that is not dispossessing people. That is not forcing them into a state of despair where they feel left behind by their governments. So we are aiming for the whole package if I’m to say that. Influencing policy, but also getting people to transition in a fair way, with energy justice in mind.

Dr Mlangwa: I think that’s correct. We actually looked at the whole package. We aim for people to move away from the energies which are harmful to them healthwise and environmentally. We intend to trigger action-oriented programs and projects through the dissemination of our results. We hope it can trigger collaborations, initiatives and interventions with the different players in this space.

We are also anticipating that, from our results, there can be some kind of reorganisation of the discourse not only in the academic world but also in the international organisations, the ones dealing with climate. [Our results] can also trigger a re-examination of how the whole issue of climate mitigation and implementation has been going and how it can change for the better with more voices from the Global South. That’s also a very keen aim of ours, to change the discourse in these international spaces.

Research cooperation between the Global North and South

Q: Switching focus now. What are the main strengths of research partnerships between countries in the Global North, Denmark in this case, and the Global South?

Dr Namwase: The main strength of such partnerships is, first and foremost, the logistics. We are in contexts where research is maybe not as much of a priority for our governments as other competing interests and needs. So funds are being channelled into other things and yet new knowledge is required to inform policy. Collaborations such as this open up access to funds that allow us to do meaningful work by going on the ground and interacting with the affected communities.

Also, secondly, is the cross-pollination of ideas and disciplines. It’s an opportunity to enrich each other because we can learn from the Danish way of doing things, which I must say I really admire. And I think that is somehow rubbing off on us. At least I can speak for us here at HURIPEC. And, on their end, we challenge them in terms of decolonial approaches because it is true that when you’ve grown up in Europe, you have a certain way that you see yourself in the world and a certain way that you’ve been given knowledge about the world. We can challenge that from a decolonial perspective.

Another strength of the collaborative research grants with Denmark is the PhDs. Africa suffers a very low PhD percentage rate per capita compared to global percentages. The charcoal project supports one PhD from Uganda and one from Tanzania. So the grants help build the much-needed expertise on the continent through scholarships for local PhDs.

Dr Mlangwa: I think Dr Sylvie did a good job exhausting it. I just want to continue emphasising that cross-pollination is really the greatest, and it’s not only for the South but everyone. Because I know this is very important in academic career advancement and professional development. So feeding into each other through such collaborative research is a win-win for both sides, as well as for our professional development.

Q: Do you have any ideas on how to improve research cooperation between Denmark and your respective countries?

Dr Mlangwa: l think there should be a player who coordinates the three countries. It would have been good if we could have an institution which is our monitor or a coordinator taking an audit of everything. It’s a lesson learned for everybody to do the audits themselves, but I’ve seen many collaborations where there is such [a coordinator]. They are more efficient and cost-effective.

Dr Namwase: I very much appreciate the opportunity to collaborate, and I’ve already given the reasons why I find it such a rare opportunity, at least from where I’m sitting. But with that said, I think one of the issues that could be looked into is the issue of overhead percentages that go to the Global South universities. It could be a problem that we have as Global South universities, but it is a thing that the universities also want to get their hands on the [international] funds that are coming to particular research centres. So perhaps there should be some specific percentage that is put aside for the central university and then a percentage for the department.

The second is the issue of travel visas. I can tell you the visa question is such a headache. It’s very disorienting and demoralising. I don’t know if it has changed, but it was quite notorious right after COVID. You could go three months without your passport because you’ve submitted it for a visa. On this project, we had a colleague who got his visa on the day and then had to travel [to Denmark] and return to Tanzania the same day.

Dr Mlangwa: Yes. That was painful.

Dr Namwase: It’s really not necessary because we sit back and feel like, “Okay, are we like some of the biggest criminals or what?”. And it can ruin it. You know that imbalance in the team? It’s a reminder that there is that hierarchy.

Adrian Ganic is M.Sc., THE LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONIMCS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE and a DDRN Correspondent

Mozambican Researchers and Civil Society Challenge Systemically Flawed Climate Change Adaptation Solutions in their Country

Alberica Rindi — Thu, 23 Jan 2025 23:59:45 +0000

Despite being one of the countries with the lowest carbon footprint per capita (0.21 vs 6.6 in DK), Mozambique is one of the most vulnerable countries to climate change. Cyclones and floods have intensified in the past decades, devastating infrastructures, homes and destroying crops and agricultural land. Severe droughts and change in rain patterns have made yields less predictable and life more precarious. 80% of the population relies on small scale agriculture for livelihood, making Mozambican’s lives highly vulnerable to changes in the climate.

Climate Change Policies and REDD+

In 2007, the United Nations introduced a group of market driven climate adaptation strategies under the name of “Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries”, in short “REDD”, which was later expanded to REDD+, to include a few new elements such as conservation and enhancement of forest carbon stocks and sustainable forest management.

These initiatives aimed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) through market incentivized reforestation projects in low-income countries. Trees would be planted and grown and their ability to capture carbon monitored and then certified to be sold on the carbon market. Financed by a number of western countries such as Norway, Denmark, Spain, Japan and the EU, they have been implemented all over the world, in resource and forest rich countries such as various provinces of Mozambique, in the name of combating climate change.

In the years since its inception up to today, REDD+ programs have been widely criticized for not only failing to address the causes of deforestation and thereby intensifying the climate crisis, but also taking away land from indigenous people and local communities preventing them to continue the activities they depend on for survival.

Boaventura Monjane & Natasha Bruna

Mozambican researchers Boaventura Monjane and Natasha Bruna, (PHD in Postcolonialisms and Global Citizenship, Development Studies and Political ecology respectively) have been studying the impact of climate change and extractivism on rural livelihoods in Mozambique for many years. Their research lies at the intersection of climate justice, food sovereignty, land and resource grabbing, agrarian movements and peasants’ rights. Most recently, they have explored the impact of market based climate solutions in Mozambique, especially REDD+ or CSA (climate-smart-agriculture) programs, both part of the main national policy for climate change mitigation and adaptation.

The Nhambita Community Carbon Project

Together with local civil society organisations such as Justicia Ambiental, Uniao Nacional de Camponese and Alternactiva, Boaventura and Natasha have been researching the impact of REDD+ projects in the central Mozambique as well as alternative local adaptation initiatives. Following the “participatory research approach”, the communities in which they conducted their research “did not participate as objects of study in the classic and traditional sense of extractive research, but as active subjects.” They were directly involved in the design of the research proposal and research objectives as well as included in knowledge- building and dissemination. One of the communities they worked with is Nhambita, where a REDD+ project called “Nhambita Community Carbon project” was implemented.

Nhmabita is a small village in the province of Sofala in central Mozambique, at the border to Gorongosa National Park, where peasants live off small scale agriculture following ancestral practices. In the 2000s an English company called Envirotrade took over some of the land of the region and employed local farmers to grow trees for reforestation. In the contract, peasant farmers agreed to cede part of their lands to plant trees for Envirotrade. They were not consulted nor informed about the nature of their work. “They brought plants and we planted them” explains Chabane Francisco Sacho, secretary of the people of Nhambita. A plant nursery was established where local women took care of giving life to seeds and care for the plants until they would be planted in the soil.

Some peasants explain they had to sacrifice their own produce to plant trees instead, yet the company promised long term substantial salaries and several additional benefits. Farmers committed to taking care of the trees minimum of 7 years in return for a wage, after that the trees should have been cared for up to 100 years. However, after a few years, the company left abruptly without saying a word, owing the farmers’ salaries and explanations. Until today, many of the farmers don’t know why the company left and why the company wanted them to plant trees.

Envirotrade was selling the equivalent of the carbon captured by the trees planted in Nhambita, on the European and US carbon market. The company earned money through the sale of these carbon credits to other companies in other parts of the world. The buyers bought themselves a “green” image and the right to continue to pollute. When the carbon prices fell, it wasn’t economically viable anymore to continue with the project, so Envirotrade disappeared.

Some farmers recount how they continued to care for the trees in the hope of Envirotrade’s return, and in fear of potential consequences, if they were to take down the trees for their own use of the land. Through the farmer’s recounts, it became clear that the local communities “no longer had decision-making power over the use and benefits from their own land”.

During their research, Natasha and Boaventura organised workshops, where they explained to the participating farmers the concept of climate change, what the trees were used for and how carbon markets work. Farmers could share their own experiences of changes in the climate and soil, the difficulties they encountered and were asked to provide their wishes and ideas about tackling the changes in climate and create resilience in their communities.

From mining, energy and agricultural extractivism to green extractivism

The exploitation of Mozambican resources for the international market has a long history. Mozambique’s economy has long been based on extraction of natural resources, from coal, oil, gas, to timber and agricultural produce. Continuing a legacy of neoliberal colonialism, the government relied its development model mainly on extractive activities for export, welcoming foreign direct investment in mining and monocultures of for example eucalyptus, rubber trees, timber. Natasha explains how Mozambique quickly became an “extractive hub nurturing other countries’ industrialisation with energy and primary commodities”. While this might have increased the GDP, it did not reduce poverty, nor did it benefit the population at large; on the contrary, it resulted in unaccounted social and environmental negative externalities.[iv] More than 60% of the population is still lacking access to safe water, health facilities or education.
Mining, timber logging, firewood and charcoal production and industrial agriculture are all extractive activities that have laid and continue to lay at the root of forest degradation in Mozambique.

Access to land is a great source of inequality in the country. In the north, gas mining from European and North American companies and timber logging for Chinese export have been associated with displacements and murders; in the center, coal mining from Indian companies, sand mines from Russian companies.

The rush to carbon credits has exacerbated the land rush in Mozambique, especially high biodiversity areas to capture carbon and sell it on international markets. This results in the rural population’s lost ability to rightfully benefit from the ecological assets of their land. Natasha explains how the current climate policies are a continuation of the extractive development model giving rise to green extractivism, “a variation of extractivism that is based on the extraction, expropriation and transfer of emissions rights from rural poor, in favour of foreign accumulation”.

Mount Mabu Community

Boaventura and Natasha also investigated a different approach to climate adaptation in the Mabu community, in the district of Lugela, Zambezia Province.

The Mabu community resides at the feet of Mount Mabu, and similar to Nhambita has a great biodiversity potential, attractive for international corporations. In an interview with Boaventura and Natasha, Jose Ogaste Mardoela, president of the Limbue peasant association, recounts that the area available to them has been reduced throughout the years with the advent of international corporations such as Portucel Mozambique (owned by Portuguese “The Navigator Company) planting vast areas of Eucalyptus monocultures for paper production; or Indian owned Mozambique Holding’s monocultures of rubber trees, “causing terrible social and environmental impacts”.
In collaboration with the local environmental organisation Justicia Ambiental since 2009, the community comes together to identify challenges and opportunities and how to defend their local needs and interests. They discuss and develop best practices to ensure sustainable use of the forests.

The people here helped and inspired each other to care for and conserve their biodiversity and ancestral practices. They practice conservation agriculture, small livestock raising and sustainable forest product foraging, all activities that contribute to the mitigation and adaptation to climate change at the same time ensuring livelihood to the families.
As part of the participatory research, three people from the community of Nhambita were invited to join the trip to Mabu community to share experience and knowledge between the communities. With the help of Justicia Ambiental, the inhabitants of Mabu were able to create associations able to inform and stand judicial conflicts with national and international corporations.
“Before the association we had no control, people from far away would arrive and take what they wanted. But now we have an association, people can’t just come in” says Filomena Vilinho Socré, vice president of the association of women of Limbue.

Justicia Ambiental and the community continue to collaborate to ensure that the communities have the right to determine how to best use the local natural resources. For Boaventura and Natasha this is an example to follow if we want to achieve climate justice.

PLAs

With the help of external funding, in the past 20 years the government has been designing plans of adaptation so-called “PLA – planos locais de adaptacao” for several districts in the country. As of today, many have already expired or are about to expire, but were never implemented. While a few communities (approx. less than 0.5%) were involved in the research process, it was by far representative, and many plans ended up being investment plans very similar to each other and were forgotten in the closet.

Conclusion

Current climate change adaptation solutions in Mozambique are mostly top-down strategies extractive in nature, often funded by and benefitting the global north, perpetuating inequality and expropriation.
Local communities have no or very limited say into solutions that should benefit them and mitigate climate change. In this regard, Redd+ projects have been widely criticized for their inefficiency and for doing more harm than good, by reducing climate adaptation to a mere trading and market mechanism, rather than taking the needs and rights of the communities and areas involved into account.

Boaventura and Natasha’s researches argue how full participation of the local and indigenous communities needs to be ensured for a just climate mitigation. Their needs should be met and prioritized, and community members should have decision power concerning projects in their areas.

They advocate for equal and inclusive participation of the target group in the design and implementation of climate change adaptation solutions and for setting a stop to the extractive nature of development in the name of climate change.

Alberica Rindi is a MSc. in Global Development, University of Copenhagen

Boaventura and Natasha’s extensive research and findings can be accessed either as part of the book “Climate Justice and Participatory Research: Building climate-resilient commons” or viewed in the documentary: “For our forest”.

Carbon markets were created in the aftermath of the Kyoto Protocol in 2005. They are specialized types of financial markets where carbon credits can be sold and bought between both state and non-state actors such as
companies. Carbon credits are allowances which permit to emit a specific amount of carbon dioxide (C02) or greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) to the entity who
owns it. Credits are created through the certification of carbon offsets or carbon capture; the reduction or removal of GHG from the atmosphere.

The IFRO – KNUST partnership: Strengthening higher education and research capacity

Arne Wangel — Thu, 23 Jan 2025 13:22:34 +0000

The Department of Food and Resource Economics (IFRO) at University of Copenhagen maintains several long-term research partnerships with African universities. Recently, DDRN had the opportunity to interview two visiting faculty members from the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology in Kumasi (KNUST), Ghana: Dr. Lawrence Kwabena Brobbey, Department of Silviculture and Forest Management, and Dr. Enoch Kwame Tham-Agyekum, Department of Agricultural Economics, Agribusiness and Extension.

Joining the conversation were Dr. Tseganesh Wubale Tamirat, Postdoc at Department of Food and Resource Economics, Section for Production, Markets and Policy, and the host Søren Marcus Pedersen, who is an Associate Professor at IFRO. Søren explains that he only got involved with doing research in Ghana as part of the five-year Climate-Smart Cocoa Agroforestry Research in Ghana (CLIMCARG) project, which was launched in 2020 and led by Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology (KNUST), Ghana, with partner institutions Aarhus University (AU), Denmark, University of Copenhagen (UCPH), Denmark, and Cocoa Research Institute of Ghana (CRIG), Ghana. Søren elaborates that the project is focusing on two areas in Ghana: One in Offinso Municipal area and one in Adansi North District of Ghana. We have done some experiments there and investigated what farmers’ perceptions of resilience are in these areas, he says.

However, starting a year ago, we have had a partnership where we look into the collaboration between Ghana and Denmark, which includes a capacity building aspect. I will be going to Kumasi both for the CLIMCARG project and for teaching a course called ‘Technology Assessment’ under the Ghana Climate University Network (GCUN) Project. GCUN is coordinated by University of Eastern Finland and involves KNUST and UCC (University of Cape Coast in Ghana. GCUN is a capacity building project where we also have guests coming from Kumasi to Denmark. Lawrence and Enoch are our first guests, they have been staying here at IFRO for nearly two months.

Q: Can you explain a bit about how the project came about. In Denmark, there is a debate about inequalities in research partnerships between North and South researchers.

Søren: The experience which I have so far with the CLIMCARG project is that it is coordinated by KNUST and Associate Professor Victor Rex Barnes, is the coordinator. So, they have been very much involved in the whole proposal writing, thus having had the leading role. It is mainly Aarhus University who had connections to KNUST, and they initiated the proposal. Our university was invited to contribute to economics and adoption aspects.

Strengthening higher education

Q: Dr. Tseganesh Wubale Tamirat, you have been here for quite a few years. What is your story? How did that come about?

I came to Denmark 13 years ago in 2011. I did my master’s degree and continued to do a PhD. Now, I am a post doc working in the area of socioeconomics and environmental aspects of technology adoption in agriculture. Currently, I am involved in European projects on robotics. I got invited by Søren to participate in the GCUN project. During the proposal development, there was a need for analyses by physically going to the place in Ghana and discussing with the staff about what is really needed. That was done by the project coordinator Professor Frank Berninger of University of Eastern Finland.

The GCUN project is a partnership involving University of Eastern Finland, University of Copenhagen and KNUST and UCC in Ghana. It focuses on three elements of higher education: 1) curriculum, 2) mentoring of junior faculty, and 3) students.

First, we did an analysis of what is being offered, then 6-8 courses were selected, then ways of mainstreaming indigenous knowledge into the university teaching and education were developed. That is one of the most interesting aspects of the project, when it comes to capacity building, making the curriculum ready to be adapted to the local capacity focusing on climate change. I think the most important part of curriculum development is integration of indigenous knowledge which is being facilitated by a local NGO called Center for Indigenous Knowledge for Organizational Development (CIKOD). Using the concept of an Africa Learning Institute, CIKOD brings together several stakeholders including traditional leaders, policy makers and educational leaders in a workshop to discuss problems and find solutions. Some of the courses under GCUN are offered as in-person intensive courses while some are distance education type courses.

Second, focusing on the junior faculty, the objective is partly to increase their visibility and professional network and to create ways of future collaboration in joint grant proposal writing and co-authorship of publications. Besides that, we also have training in research and communication methods to equip junior faculty members with research and pedagogical competences.

Third, to improve employability of graduates, we facilitate internships through partnerships with the private sector. The idea is to have clearly defined objectives of internship for students with the expectation that this will increase their opportunity of employment after graduation.

We also train the students to develop entrepreneurial mentality. For example, business training is provided by a Dutch contractor and in collaboration with the Incubation Centers at KNUST and UCC. Based upon competition among applications, we have selected some startups who get leadership training and receive a small grant to develop their ideas into businesses.

Impact of research

Q: The findings you develop in your research, to what extent do they translate into advice to farmers, to what extent are they used in terms of changing practices of farmers?

Lawrence: I can cite an example from my postdoc – also supported by DANIDA – concerning the conflict between farmers and cattle herders. Originally, the Ghanaian State used to drive away the herders, they would push them to a certain area, in the dry season – from colonial period to about 10 years ago – to regulate herding activities so that the herders do not end up destroying farmland. In doing this research, all the actors were involved in addressing the conflict of livelihood between farmers and cattle herders.

We did the work and then went to share our findings at districts, regional and national for a. Before, the herders were antagonistic, they did not want to participate in meetings. That is one good thing about sharing our analysis. We developed policy briefs which we shared with State actors and regulators.

In a different project on charcoal production and livelihood that was also funded by DANIDA, we invited farmers, charcoal producers, practitioners and policy makers to a workshop. A translator translated everything to the understanding of the farmers and charcoal producers. Not only did we make publications, but we also went back to them and told them about the information we got from them. We made a charcoal documentary and showed it to them. We also ended up with an international wood fuel conference in Ghana.

Q: You are making policy briefs, what is your assessment of the impact at the political level of your findings – is the government taking some of your advice.

Lawrence and Enoch explain: For charcoal, the government is taking advice. Through our study, we proved to them that it is a source of livelihood contributing so much even in an area that was known for food production. It was the food basket of the country. Charcoal was the second source of income.

We suggested to the government to find other means of regulating the charcoal sector. And because most of the charcoal producers double as farmers, they can also practice agroforestry – i.e. they intercrop – crops with trees. If they plant the trees in their farms, they can use the same trees to produce the charcoal.

In one of the policy briefs, we recommended that the government should give priority to agroforestry at the community level, where small sized communities were to establish maybe 2-5 acres of wood lots.

If charcoal production is established as a form of plantation, you would deny people food. You see, the government suspended that idea. That was something they had planned; they had announced it. They had to back off and suspend their decision.

We convinced the State officials that agriculture comprises food crops and animals. So, if you want to favor just one, in terms of food crops, then the State will suffer. In some way, the State understood us and implemented some of our recommendations. The politicians will not tell you that: I am doing that because of what this person said to me. But we normally involve them in all our activities: Inception, during the project, and then we end up with the policy brief.

Strengthening research capacity

Q: Do you have proposals to improve the exchange of researchers

Søren: I have one recommendation, a more practical one. I think it is too difficult to find accommodation. Lawrence, you found your accommodation yourself, because you have been here before. It is always a problem to find available rooms in Copenhagen.

Lawrence: As a beneficiary, I think it is a good thing. I had an opportunity to do a PhD, and it was a joint PhD. When I returned to Ghana, I realized the difference between me and the other students, because the cross-culture experience is something you cannot get in Ghana.

You come here and have access to all the articles. I had initially cited from textbooks; you do not have easy access to journal articles in Ghana. I came to Denmark, and I could access any article I want, instead of asking our colleagues to download and send it to you. That alone, for me, it improves you.

It is a requirement for Danish PhDs to attend conferences. In Ghana, we do not have that. So, it was later that University of Ghana did a policy which the other universities adopted. At first, we were focused on the monograph theses, you become a lecturer and as a PhD you still have challenges writing papers. But then Universities in Ghana have changed – and that was also part of the Building Stronger Universities project that they did with Denmark – to article writing.

“Ghana – a middle-income country? You don’t feel it!”

Now, it is also mandatory to publish even before appointment. So, you can see, from Denmark, we are improving the university. About 5-6 years ago, DFC decided to take Ghana out. The only window we are allowed is when it is water related.

Søren: That was because you were entering a middle-income status. Lawrence: Middle income on paper! You don’t feel it!

Q: Concerning the DFC research grant scheme – the two-step process: Pitching the project idea, then full proposal if selected, and the terms and conditions attached – what is your assessment.

Søren: I like the grant system. It is relatively simple compared to other ways of getting funding compared to the EU and other bureaucratic schemes. I am not a big fan of the two-step process – because you must restart anyway. Although the first one is short, you still must consider the budget and an overview of the whole proposal even though you only have 5% chance of getting the final funding. I prefer a one-step application procedure. It is important also to consider the balance…there used to be a rule that about 50% of the budget should go to the South. I think DFC could be more flexible because of the balance of salaries among different institutions. Also, it may sometimes be a strength – e.g. the CLIMCARG project – we are two universities involved – Aarhus University and University of Copenhagen. We have a minor share. Sometimes, it can be good to have two Danish institutions involved because there can be some competences you need from different partners. In that regard, the budget can be quite small in my view.

“If only we had that opportunity to learn among ourselves in the South”

Q: Do you have ideas how to improve the research cooperation between Denmark and Ghana? Any proposals for reform?

Lawrence and Enoch explain: I hope there can be some small grants because DFC grants are for big projects. But at times, we need a small grant to study a particular issue, but that is something which DFC does not have. When it comes to wildlife conservation, the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia has some funds that they give 2.000 – 3.000 – 5.000. Master students are applying to conduct their study. If it is published, they top it up for you. If DFC also would give such small grants.

Tseganesh: In my opinion, the first phase of DANIDA proposal assessment could be shortened. Currently, applicants have to wait a long time to know whether their proposal has been selected for the next stage. If it could be shortened, they could have more time to work on the second stage of the application. I would also add that DANIDA could improve the provision of feedback with detailed explanation of proposal internal assessment including precise scores.

Lawrence: If DFC was to allow some form of South-South cooperation, there are certain issues that cut across within the South like farmer-herder conflicts. Maybe Nigeria – it is worse there. If only we had that opportunity to learn among ourselves in the South.